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Abstract 
 In this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine 
Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to 
accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of 
plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be 
is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes 
that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that 
happens at worlds.  
 However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to 
chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by 
Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an 
ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However, 
plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no 
similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not 
collapse into the chance-based principle.  
 But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR 
that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found 
and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and 
Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any 
world.  
 This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or 
isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any 
possible world.  
 The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The 
former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its 
neutrality either way, to its detriment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 David Lewis’ abductive argument for genuine modal realism (GMR), to my mind, 
offers, inter alia, the most complete theory of modality in contemporary philosophy, and 
is itself one of the most complete theories in the history of philosophy in terms of its 
scope. It is also one of the most widely rejected views. Nevertheless, the reason it 
remains is because Lewis has offered impressive and powerful argumentation on its 
behalf.  
 That being said, I think GMR suffers from a hidden and most unwelcome 
implication. As the theory stands, GMR implies that--at least according to one attractive 
group of theories about the nature of human agency--there are no agents at any possible 
world. ('Agency' here is akin to 'free will.' But I prefer the term agency for reasons that 
are reviewed later.) The group of theories I am referring to is the agent causation theories. 
 This is so because of Lewis formulation of plenitude (see Section 2.4). Plenitude 
basically expresses that: “…absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way 
that some world is…[and]…every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way 
that some part of some world is” (Lewis, 1986d, p. 2). What I am going to argue is that 
plenitude tacitly assumes that chance and nomological principles of a world are jointly 
sufficient to account for everything that happens at a world.  
 However, there are many theories of agency that say free will is neither reducible 
to chance nor determined by physics; that free will, which often evinces reason, is a 
causal force in its own right. Can such theories be reconciled with GMR? They cannot, I 
argue. Reason and worldly processes (physics and chance) are fundamentally different 
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kinds of causal forces. If they are fundamentally different kinds of causal forces, then 
they evince fundamentally different kinds of modalities. But GMR only expresses one 
kind of modality, the world-based one. Therefore, GMR should either abandon free will 
altogether, or find another principle of plenitude to express it. However, as I shall argue 
both of these paths lead to serious consequences for GMR. Here are the claims I am 
examining in this dissertation: 
 (1) According to many theories of agency (free will), agential actions are of a 
qualitatively different kind of modality than chance-based modality. 
 (2) But plenitude in GMR only accounts for “chance-based” modality. 
 (3) No similar principle of plenitude can be given for agential modality that does 
not collapse into the chance-based plenitude principle. 
 (4) But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate isolation (the 
doctrine that the worlds are spatiotemporally and causally isolated) because such a 
principle implies transworld causation.  
 (5) If no agential plenitude principle can be found AND there is agential modality, 
then plenitude fails or at least is not guaranteed (which is the same as failure for GMR). 
 (6) If there is no such thing as agency at our world, and Lewis’ original 
formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any world; 
necessarily, there is no agency (from (2)). 
 (Conclusion) If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails (or at 
least is not guaranteed, which amounts to failure for GMR), or isolation fails (from (4), 
(5)). But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible 
world (from (2), (3), (6)).  
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 I should say here that the terminology in the above claims shifts to reflect the 
discussion and terms introduced in this dissertation (see Section 3.6). But this gives the 
rough shape of my dissertation. The dissertation proceeds in the following way. 
 Chapter two offers an extended overview of Lewis' argument for GMR, focusing 
primarily on his book "On the Plurality of Worlds (1986d)." Through discussing GMR, I 
also introduce key terms and concepts that are used throughout the dissertation. Key 
terms and concepts include isolation, plenitude, actuality, representation, duplication, 
counterparts, and the qualitative/de re distinction. 
 Chapter three introduces what seems strange ethically in Lewis’ theory. I begin by 
introducing a scenario which evinces the strangeness of agency and plenitude. Following 
this, I look at a number of ways philosophers have tried to cash out this strangeness. In 
broad terms, the arguments try to show that GMR implies either some kind of fatalism, or 
that nothing one does matters, or that our desires about our world simultaneously 
implicate us in not-so-nice desires about other worlds. Andrew Beedle, in particular, 
introduces a fork argument that says that either GMR implies modal fatalism, or it 
requires our desires for good at our world to be eo ipso tinged by desires for evil at other 
worlds. I show that his argument in particular, and others like it, do not work. The 
intuition is correct: that GMR would require us to rethink ourselves as ethical agents. But 
their arguments do not succeed. Basically, I say that they should have argued that because 
free will is of a fundamentally different causal order than “worldly” forces, this implies 
two fundamentally different kinds of modality, and that GMR only accounts for one. 
 Chapter four introduces the sense of free will I work with. Basically, I use agent-
causation theories of free will that say that agency is a causal force that is neither causally 
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determined, nor “chancy” or random. At that point, I stop using “free will” and just stick 
with “agency” and its derivatives. I discuss two other kinds of views about free will in 
this chapter. First, the hard determinist thinks there is no free will. Second, a soft 
determinist is one who think determinism and free will are compatible; the compatibilists. 
I am agnostic on whether a soft determinist view could be amenable to some kind of 
agent causation view. I will assume they are not since an agent causationist does not think 
that chance, physics and initial conditions of the universe are the only causal forces.1  
 This is a harmless stipulation since I do not need to settle the debates between 
these three families of views of free will. My task is to show that if agent causation views 
are a plausible view, then they imply a whole other kind of modality. If they employ a 
whole other kind of modality, then GMR must account for this in some way, whether it 
be arguing against agent causation views, or incorporating agent causation into GMR (I 
do not think this latter method is possible, as will be discussed). 
 To spell out the kinds of modalities in play, chance-based (or worldly) and 
agential, I employ a device from ancient Greek philosophy called the tuche/techne 
antithesis. In very general terms, this antithesis can be explained this way. Tuche is the 
Greek word for chance, or luck; it can be understood as the “world left to itself.” A 
techne can be translated as art, craft, science, skill. A techne always evinces reason. A 
skillful application of a techne can mitigate, or possibly eliminate, the effects of tuche. 
The important point about this distinction is that these two sides are defined against each 
other and one cannot be reduced to the other; they are not compatible. I think this Greek 
view offers resources to cash out the agent causationist claim that reason is a causal force 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, parts of the world are causally effective, but it is often assumed that knowing initial conditions 
and/or physics will give the relevant explanations for them. 
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along with the world. I also explain in this chapter how modality for each side of the 
antithesis would work. This discussion gets me claim (1) above. 
 Chapter 5 defends (2) through (Conclusion). First, I argue that Lewis’ formulation 
of plenitude only captures “world-based,” or tuche-based modality. I also explain there 
can be no formulation of plenitude for agents that does not collapse into Lewis’ original 
formulation. The basic idea is this. Imagine a two-world plurality of worlds with one 
agent at each world: Hank and Harold. Suppose two actions can be selected, jumping and 
whistling. Both of these are technes. Hank reasons through his choice and decides to 
whistle. Harold reasons through his choice and decides to…whistle? He cannot; 
according to plenitude, he must jump. Unpacking such stories leads to my point that 
Lewis’ formulation of plenitude only expresses tuche-based modality and plenitude could 
only express tuche-based possibilities (3). 
 But suppose such an agential principle of plenitude could be found that preserves 
agency in the agent causation sense. This would imply a transworld causal force, thus 
isolation would fail (4). I argue for this by explaining what I call the transworld butterfly 
effect. An agent’s choice would have causal implications for other worlds, even ones 
without agents.  
 But suppose Lewis or a genuine modal realist would want to keep agential 
causation even though it is not “covered by” plenitude (5). Well, that is just the point. 
Agent causation would mean that plenitude just does not hold since agents might choose 
to do the same things, like Hank and Harold both choosing to whistle, though both had 
jumping in their modal profiles. However, it is hard to imagine the motivation for GMR 
without plenitude. 
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 So this gets us to the other prong of the fork: if Lewis or a Lewisian insists the 
Lewis’ formulation of plenitude is correct and therefore abandons agency, then 
necessarily, there is no agency at any world (6). This gets (Conclusion): If there is agency 
and GMR holds, then plenitude fails or is not guaranteed, and isolation fails (from (4), 
(5)). But if there is no agency, then necessarily there is no agency at any possible world 
(from (2), (3), (6)). 
 The problem, though, for the Lewisian is that GMR is the wrong kind of argument 
to settle the agency debate. For one thing, it insists on isolation. This means there is no 
empirical way to argue for plenitude; there are only philosophical ways. And since 
agency theories are not obviously incoherent, philosophical discussions about it cannot be 
ruled out. They certainly cannot be ruled out for all possible worlds. This would be true 
even if it were proven that we are not agents in the agent causation sense at our world. 
For another thing, part of what Lewis had going for GMR was that it was supposedly 
flexible enough to cover all modality. Since it is not, GMR has to take a decisive and far-
reaching position on agency. In effect, GMR loses its flexibility and objectivity, and there 
is no way to determine in any worthwhile way why we should accept POR. 
 Before starting, there are some terminological points I would like to address. 
1.1 Assumptions and Definitions 
 Here are some explanations of how I will be using three sets of key terms in this 
discussion. 
 First, it will seem that I sometimes use terms like “chance,” “chance process,” 
“physics,” “nomological principles,” and any derivatives interchangeably. The obvious 
problem with such an approach is that chance and physics are often seen as being 
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diametrically opposed, at least in certain senses of the terms. Like thinking of chance as 
random and physics as rule based. However, there are other senses in which they are 
complementary.2 For example, one might think that our universe is this way, but it could 
have been a different way. The chance process "selected" the way our universe came to 
be, including our nomological principles, or physics. With regard to GMR, Lewis 
(1986d) says that "[d]ifferent worlds have all different outcomes of the chance process" 
(p. 129). In this sense, then, chance and physics are complementary because it is the 
chance process that "selects" the physics of a given world.  
 The second sense in which chance and physics can be considered complementary 
is that jointly, they can express what the world does when left to itself. Even if the world 
is deterministic, chance might still play a role. Consider this quote from Douglas 
Futuyma (2005): "scientists use chance...to mean that when physical causes [physics, 
nomological principles] can result in any of several outcomes, we cannot predict what the 
outcome will be in any particular case" (p. 225).3 So what unifies my usage of chance and 
physics is the initial conditions of the universe that could have been different on the one 
hand, and the role chance plays in the world on the other.4  
 I also, in many places in this dissertation, seem to jump from causation to 
explanation, and from explanation to causation. This is because, with Lewis (1986c), I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is, of course, a lot of debate in physics and philosophy on these points and I am not settling such 
issues in this dissertation. Moreover, there is good reason to think that chance and randomness are distinct 
concepts. For discussion on this, see: Antony Eagle (2014).  
3 Eagle (2014) uses this quote to set up how commonplace it is in science to associate chance and 
randomness together. However, whether or not chance and randomness come apart does not play a role in 
my dissertation. As interesting as it is, I set it to one side and commend the interested reader to Eagle's 
discussion. 
4 Even if chance does not operate in the world, the world might have been different. Our world was, in this 
sense, an outcome of the chance process. 
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am assuming that any kind of explanation is causal in nature.5 When I jump from one to 
another, this is what is in view. And I make these jumps only when discussing 
explanations of worlds and/or parts of worlds.6   
 Finally, Lewis (1986d) discusses a number of modalities that GMR is flexible 
enough accommodate and provide reductive accounts for, such as nomological, 
epistemic, doxastic, etc. (pp. 5-20; 27-50). However, I write as if there are only two kinds 
of modality: world-based modality and agent-based modality. I do this for the sake of 
ease of reading. Lewis considers these kinds of modalities as unified by some story about 
each world's initial conditions and the chance process. For this reason, I think I am fine 
using this stylistic choice. 
 Any other terms and assumptions I use are brought up as needed. I turn now to 
Lewis’ theory. 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also Bradford Skow (forthcoming). Lewis (1986d) elsewhere says: "Explanations give causal or 
nomological information" (p. 133). 
6 'Parts of worlds' includes persons, whether or not they are agents. 
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Chapter 2: David Lewis' Theory of GMR 
 This chapter discusses the thesis of Lewis' GMR, focusing primarily on those 
themes that appear repeatedly throughout the dissertation. I italicize key concepts 
throughout the chapter.  
 According to Lewis (1986d), GMR is “the thesis that the world we are part of is 
but one of a plurality of worlds, and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of 
all the inhabitants of all the worlds” (p. vii). 
 Let us take our world. What all is included under the verb “inhabit?” Lewis 
(1986d) says that our world:  
 "...is a very inclusive thing. Every stick and every stone you have ever seen is 
part of it. And so are you and I. And so are the planet Earth, the solar system, the 
entire Milky Way, the remote galaxies we see through telescopes, and (if there are 
such things) all the bits of empty space between the stars and galaxies...Likewise 
the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-gone 
pterodactyls, no long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor 
are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of this same 
world...[N]othing is so alien in kind as not to be part of our world, provided only 
that it does exist at some distance and direction from here, or at some time before 
or after or simultaneous with now" (p. 1). 
So our world just is the mereological sum of its spatiotemporally and/or causally related 
parts (Lewis, 1986d, p. 69). Our world is not “alone,” though. There are countless other 
worlds, spatiotemporally and causally isolated from this world (see Section 2.3). The 
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plurality of worlds just is the mereological sum of all the worlds (and their parts) (see 
Section 2.7).  
 This is the theory in broad strokes. Of course, many questions immediately spring 
up such as “how can we know about the worlds if they are spatiotemporally and causally 
isolated?” But a more fundamental question is “Why believe in a plurality of worlds” 
(Lewis, 1986d, p. 3)? Lewis (1986d) answers: “Because the hypothesis is serviceable, 
and that is a reason to think that it is true" (p. 3). 
 How is it serviceable? And can one get these same benefits without “concrete” 
possible worlds? There are many ways the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds is 
servicable. Historically speaking, the analysis of necessity as truth across all possible 
worlds started as a helpful heuristic in many areas of philosophy. Then, philosophers 
started offering "a great many more analyses that make reference to possible worlds, or to 
possible individuals that inhabit possible worlds" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 3). As talk of possible 
worlds progressed, Lewis (1986d) continues, the heuristic offered a great deal of clarity 
in many areas of philosophical inquiry, including but not limited to: philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of science (p. 
3).  
 And as Lewis (1986d) observes, the “most straightforward way to gain honest 
title” to the “theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings” is to “accept such talk as 
the literal truth” (p. 4). Many kinds of theories do this by positing that the plurality of 
worlds are linguistic constructs, or pictorial constructs, or some other kind of construct 
that differ in fundamental ways from the “real” world, but are nevertheless real entities.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Combinatorialism is sometimes discussed when talk of possibilia comes up. Anyway, for overviews of 
and discussions about GMR and alternatives to GMR, I recommend: (Melia, 2008), (Sider, 2003), and 
	   11	  	  
These theories represent the attempts at real possible worlds without them also being 
"concrete."8 There are well known issues with primitive modality in these theories, in 
addition to certain theoretical problems.9 With regard to primitive modality, none of these 
ersatz theories can characterize modality without modal language. Most ersatzists freely 
confess this point as one of the ongoing problems (see for example, (Melia, 2008)).10 
 Lewis, however, developed an "even more literal" version of this literal truth 
approach. For Lewis, the plurality of worlds contains worlds and parts just as “real” as 
our own world. 
 One benefit his “literal truth” approach affords is that it gives a reductive account 
of modality. Thus, Lewis (1986d) argues that the plurality of worlds affords philosophy 
"the wherewithal to reduce the diversity of notions we must accept as primitive, and 
thereby to improve the unity and economy of the theory that is our professional concern--
total theory, the whole of what we take to be true" (p. 4). Lewis (1986d) compares it to 
what set theory did for mathematics; "we have only to believe in the vast hierarchy of 
sets, and there we find entities suited to meet the needs of all the branches of 
mathematics" (p. 3). Hilbert called this a paradise for mathematicians; Lewis (1986d) 
offers the realms of logical space to philosophers as paradise (p. 4). But paradise has a 
price.  
 The cost? We get theoretical unity, economy of theory, a serviceable theory, and 
pay for it in ontological commitment. Lewis thinks the price is right.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Divers, 2009). 
8 I am using 'concrete' here as a shortcut to mean "just as real as our world." Really, though, it is 
notoriously difficult to spell out the concrete/abstract distinction. Lewis (1986d) recognizes this very well 
and also does not prefer such terminology (pp. 81-85). 
9 Lewis (1986d) discusses these in detail (pp. 136-191). 
10 But they claim that while they must (at least as of now) accept primitive modality, at least they do not 
have the heavy ontological commitments of the holder of GMR. 
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 But Lewis (1986d) allows that the price may be higher than it appears; for 
example "[m]aybe the price is higher than it seems, because modal realism has 
unacceptable hidden implications" (p. 4). This is where the dialectic of this dissertation is 
grounded. I am arguing for hidden metaphysical implications that make the cost far too 
high. 
 In summary, he thinks the reasons given are good reasons to think that the theory 
is true. But he does not, however, think they are conclusive (Lewis, 1986d, p. 4). Thus, he 
is making an abductive argument for GMR; he is making an appeal to the best 
explanation given what we have and know. So “why believe in a plurality of worlds?” 
Lewis (1986d) answers: “Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to 
think that it is true" (p. 3). The fact that Lewis offers an abductive argument affects how 
one should argue against it, if one is so inclined (and I am).  This could be done in a few 
ways. One can find another theory that best accounts for our current data while providing 
the unity and economy of theory. Or, as mentioned previously, one can find hidden costs 
of the argument, which is the path I am taking.  
 The rest of this chapter explains his analysis of GMR, emphasizing those themes 
that prominently feature in my own analysis. 
2.1 Quantification, Accessibility Relations and Counterpart Relations 
 Lewis begins with the plurality of worlds; that is, the content of logical space. 
Logical space is synonymous with the whole of the plurality of worlds; it is "the totality 
of the worlds in all their glory" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 73). As such, any true proposition is 
true in virtue of a world or a part of a world.11  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For more information, see Section 2.4. 
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 Probably the most (in)famous applications of GMR is to modality.12 Modal claims 
are true in virtue of worlds and/or their parts. Consider the following modal statements. 
The first two are taken from Lewis (1986d, pp. 5-9) and the third is based on Lewis: 
 a.) Possibly, there are blue swans. 
 b.) Necessarily, friction produces heat. 
 c.) I could have become a medical doctor, but instead I chose philosophy. 
Before discussing the genuine modal realist analysis of these claims, it merits mention 
that there are many well-known problems associated with analysis of modal claims. Here 
is a sampling. In virtue of what are claims like a.) and c.) true or false? It would seem 
there are no blue swans at our world, but does it follow that blue swans are not possible? 
It would seem not. Such claims are intuitively “true.” But how so, given the lack of blue 
swans? Again, c.) looks like a perfectly true statement, but how can it be analyzed? I 
have not become a medical doctor; so what does it mean to say I could have? Mutatis 
mutandis for any other such claims: there could have been 4 more trucks on Earth than 
there actually are, etc.  
 Another well-known problem with modal claims is how to understand those that 
bear on necessity and truth. If b.) is true, is it necessarily true? How should we 
understand the truth of the laws of physics and necessity?13 
 One of the great benefits of GMR is that it offers the resources to analyze such 
modal claims. The idea is that necessity and possibility claims are analyzed by the 
plurality of worlds. To show how, I begin with Lewis’ basic analysis of possibility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There are other areas of philosophy for which GMR provides wonderful resources. For a good overview 
see Lewis (1986d, pp. 5-68). However, since I am primarily concerned with modality, I will keep my 
examples to modal claims. 
13 Relatedly, mathematics presents necessarily true formulations. What is the relationship between 
mathematical truths and necessity? 
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(1986d): 
 “Presumably, whatever it may mean to call a world actual…, it had better turn 
out that the world we are part of is the actual world. What actually is the case, as 
we say, is what goes on here. That is one possible way for a world to be. Other 
worlds are other, that is unactualised, possibilities. If there are many worlds, and 
every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is, then 
whenever such-and-such might be the case, there is some world at which such-
and-such is the case. Conversely, since it is safe to say that no world is any way 
that a world could not possibly be, whenever there is some world at which such-
and-such is the case, then it might be that such-and-such is the case. So modality 
turns into quantification: possibly there are blue swans iff, for some world W, at 
W there are blue swans” (p. 5). 
I discuss Lewis’ analysis of actuality in section 2.5. Lewis’ point applies to worlds and 
parts of worlds. Suppose there was no such thing as a red car. One might say that there 
could have been a red car. Because this counterfactual is a possibility claim, it can be 
analyzed as something like: there could have been red cars if at some world X, there are 
red cars.14 Thus, as Lewis said, modal claims turn into quantification. 
 Necessity claims work in a similar way. Let us look at three kinds necessity 
claims: nomological, historical, and logical.15 Here are three such claims, based heavily 
on Lewis (1986d, pp. 7-9): 
 (1) Necessarily, friction produces heat. 
 (2) It is historically necessary that I have partially completed my dissertation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For more on counterfactuals, see Lewis (1973). 
15 Lewis (1986d) mentions a few more, including epistemic and deontic (p. 8). Such kinds of modalities 
will be handled in a similar way. 
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 (3) Necessarily, 2+2=4. 
Lewis (1986d) analyzes (1) as: “…at every world that obeys the laws of our world, 
friction produces heat. It is contingent which world is ours; hence what are the laws of 
our world;…hence what is true throughout these worlds, i.e., what is nomologically 
necessary” (p. 7). Lewis (1986d) analyzes (2) as: “at every world that perfectly matches 
ours up to now, and diverges only later if ever, [my dissertation] is at least partly written” 
(p. 7). Mathematical truths, such as (3), are analyzed as true at all possible worlds. That 
is, 2+2=4 is true at every world in the plurality.  
 This, in broad strokes, is how possibility and necessity are accounted for in 
possible-world talk. Some of the great strengths of this analysis are these: it bypasses the 
well-known complications of the modal operators being insufficient to express the variety 
of modal claims, and it offers a reductive account of modality. That is, modality is not 
primitive, but analyzed via other worlds. For more information, see Lewis (1986d, pp. 5-
20). 
 The next thing to discuss is how quantification over other worlds and their parts is 
accomplished. This is done via accessibility relations and counterpart relations 
respectively.  
  Quantification over worlds is largely restricted by an accessibility relation. An 
accessibility relation restricts quantification from the standpoint of a given world (Lewis, 
1986d, p. 7). Consider b). "Necessarily, friction produces heat." This is a nomologically 
true statement about our world. But as Lewis (1986d) also says, it is not unrestrictedly 
necessary; that is, other worlds may not have the same laws of physics we do (p. 7). 
"Necessarily," then, quantifies over those worlds that have the same laws of physics we 
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do. The accessibility relation is determined by our laws of physics, specifically the law 
that friction produces heat. 
 Lewis (1986d): "As quantification over possible worlds is commonly restricted by 
accessibility relations, so quantification over possible individuals [parts of worlds] is 
commonly restricted by counterpart relations" (p. 8) (emphasis mine). Let's take Sydney, 
Australia. Suppose I said, “Sydney could have been located 27 centimeters to the right of 
where it is now.” This is analyzable as something like “there is a world W, and there is an 
individual x in W, such that x is a counterpart of Sydney, and x is located 27 centimeters 
to the right of where Sydney is actually located.”16 The relevant counterpart of Sydney 
will be quantified over across worlds based on similarity in origins, "or in it location...or 
in the arrangement and nature of its parts, or in the role it plays in the life of a nation or a 
discipline (Lewis, 1986d, p. 8).17  
 One might wonder why Lewis cannot say that Sydney itself is located 27 
centimeters to the right at another world. This is because ordinary objects are world-
bound objects; in fact, an ordinary object just is a world-bound object. This means that 
any (ordinary) object can only exist at one world. So “Sydney itself” is “bound to” our 
world only.18 This is what makes counterpart theory necessary. 
 To sum up, I quote Lewis (1986d): “Modality de re, the potentiality and essence 
of things, is quantification over possible individuals” (p. 8). And this quantification over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Thank you to Derek Ball for help with this formulation. 
17 Note that accessibility relations and  counterpart relations are similar in that both emphasize external 
properties and relations. But there is another kind of counterpart that emphasizes intrinsic properties and 
relations called duplicates (Lewis, 1986d, pp. 50-69; 70-71). Since I am not concerned with Lewis’ use of 
quantification, I set this to one side though it is interesting as well. For more discussion on persons and 
counterparts, see Lewis (1983c, pp. 47-54). 
18 This is a consequence of Lewis’ doctrine of isolation (see Section 2.3). There are “non-ordinary” objects, 
which will be discussed later. These are transworld mereological sums (as distinct from transworld 
individuals, which do not exist on Lewis’ paradigm). 
	   17	  	  
possible individuals is done via counterpart relations. Lewis’ (1986d) more complete 
analysis of these themes can be found in the section of his book on properties (pp. 50-69).  
 The upshot of this section is that modality, via accessibility relations and 
counterpart relations, “turns into quantification” (Lewis, 1986d, p. 5). Modal claims “are 
about” other worlds and their parts and have as their truthmakers points in logical space.  
2.2 Representation De Re 
 Representation de re is up next. While Lewis’ use of representation itself does not 
play a prominent role in this dissertation, it still merits a brief discussion because it aids 
in understanding GMR generally. More specifically, it also helps in understanding 
counterpart theory, in clarifying how modality is quantification (see Section 2.1), and 
understanding the qualitative/de re distinction (see Section 2.6). 
 To begin, it is worth making explicit that Lewis (1986d) rejects the thesis that 
worlds overlap (pp. 69-71) (see section 2.3 of this chapter); each world is 
spatiotemporally and causally isolated from all the others. One consequence of this is that 
each thing is part of one world only. That is, I myself belong to this world and no other. 
The specific bag of crisps next to me exists at this world and no other. And so on for 
everything at our world. In other words, every ordinary thing, or individual, is world-
bound.19 This has an important consequence for quantification in modal claims. Consider: 
 (1) I might have died today. 
Suppose I do not die today. Then (1) is made true by a world according to which one of 
my counterpart dies. But according to what I just said, I do not die at another world 
because I myself am world-bound here. A counterpart dies at another world.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The last section mentioned “non-ordinary” objects, which are transworld mereological sums. These are 
discussed more in the next section. 
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 One of the most well-known arguments along these lines against GMR comes 
from Saul Kripke (1981):  
 “The counterpart of something in another possible world is never identical 
with the thing itself. Thus if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election (if 
only he had done such-and-such), we are not talking about something that might 
have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a “counterpart”.’ Probably, 
however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how 
much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world” (p. 
45fn13). 
 Before discussing Kripke’s problem with GMR in greater detail, I would like to 
say what exactly representation de re is. According to Lewis (1986d), the winning-
Humphrey is at another world, but is “very like [our] Humphrey in his origins, in his 
intrinsic character, or in his historical role” (p. 194). In short, the other Humphrey is one 
of our Humphrey’s counterparts. As such, the world which contains winning-Humphrey 
“represents de re” that our Humphrey won (the terminology is from Lewis (1986d, p. 
194). That is, the other “Humphrey” represents ours in victory. Lewis (1986d) says: 
“That is how it is that…our Humphrey…wins according to the other world. This is 
counterpart theory, the answer I myself favour to the question how a world represents de 
re” (p. 194).20 So, in sum, what makes it true that our Humphrey could have won is his 
counterpart that does win (Lewis, 1986d, p. 234). What makes it true that the other-
worldly counterpart could have lost is our Humphrey. The statement that I could have 
died today is made true by a counterpart of mine who does in fact die today; this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Following Lewis (1986d, pp. 194-195fn191), I too will place the following reading suggestions in a 
footnote: Lewis (1983b), Lewis (1983c), and David Kaplan (1979). But I also recommend: Lewis (1973, 
pp. 39-43), and Lewis (1983d). 
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counterpart represents my death. Again, modality is quantification over worlds and their 
parts.  
 Note, too, that because Lewis argues for world-bound individuals, representation 
de re is a key feature of GMR. It could not be our Humphrey himself who won; he lost. 
One of his counterparts must represent him as winning. I now return to Kripke’s 
objection. 
 The basic intuition in Kripke’s objection is that “de re modality has to do with the 
res itself, not some imitation or substitute or counterpart” (Lewis, 1986d, p. 195). That is, 
it is not our Humphrey himself who wins, but a counterpart; but modality is supposed to 
be about Humphrey himself. Lewis’ (1986d) response is basically that this problem if 
such it is, is not unique to GMR (pp. 192-198). That is, even ersatzers of whatever stripe 
have this same so-called problem: with them, it is a matter of finding the sentences in a 
worldmaking language that represent Humphrey’s victory, or a pictorial ersatzer would 
have to do it via some kind of picture. Even those who accept overlap and transworld 
individuals that exist at many worlds “at once" do not escape a certain version of the 
Humphrey objection. 21 Probably, the Humphrey of our world could care less if he, even 
he himself, won at another world; he still lost here. This is more or less the gist of Lewis’ 
point about the Humphrey objection.  
 So any thing is a world-bound thing.22 ‘Thing’ here is used very broadly. It can 
refer to cars, electromagnetic fields, and even the laws of physics. The ways they could 
have been different are represented by their counterparts at other worlds. In fact, because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 However, such views take on serious metaphysical problems. See Lewis (1986d, pp. 198-220). 
Nevertheless, there are defenders of GMR with overlap. For example, see Kris McDaniel (2004). 
22 Any ordinary thing. Again, there are transworld mereological sums, but these are not anything interesting 
on Lewis’ view. 
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particular things are world-bound, it makes it necessary that what could have been must 
be represented by other worlds. The world-bound thing itself is present only at one world. 
So discussing other possibilities winds up being quantification over other worlds, in 
which are represented the various ways our world could have been. 
 Representation de re also assists in understanding the qualitative/de re distinction 
(Section 2.6). The basic idea behind the qualitative/de re distinction is that de re claims 
pick out particular individuals. Qualitative claims are general. 
 I now turn to Lewis’ thesis of isolation. 
2.3 Isolation 
 In this section, I discuss Lewis’ thesis of isolation and how it fits into the story so 
far. The first thing is to make explicit the different between mereological sums and 
spatiotemporally and causally connected individuals. The latter are always world-bound 
and do not overlap with other worlds. The former are individuals of another kind. Lewis 
(1986d) is an unrestricted compositionalist (p. 211). That means that any combination of 
anything comprises a whole. Not only do the parts of my body comprise me, but there is 
also a whole comprised of one of Saturn’s rings, a penny, and fourteen clowns. It is just 
that we usually do not pay attention to such sums because they are uninteresting. 
Similarly, any combination of anything across the plurality also comprises a mereological 
sum, a whole.  If we take the set of me and all my counterparts, this is mereological 
transworld sum. But this whole does not comprise anything interesting; in fact, it has 
spatiotemporally and causally isolated parts. 
  In a similar way, the mereological sum of worlds do not comprise a grand world; 
rather the plurality of worlds has many causally and spatiotemporally isolated parts. In 
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this section, I discuss the thesis of isolation in more detail. That is, the demarcation point 
“between” worlds is discussed. 
 The world could have been different in uncountable ways. To name a few: I could 
have purchased a car today; ten more mice could have died today than actually did; the 
laws of physics might have been different; there may have been billions more (or fewer) 
people than there are; there may have been absolutely no one. This world is just one 
possible way a world could have been.  
 Lewis (1986d) asks: "Are there other worlds that are other ways" (p. 2)? He 
answers "yes" to this question. So just as our world is very inclusive, so there are 
countless other inclusive worlds. That is, just as this world has parts in time and space, so 
to do other worlds have other-worldly parts in other-worldly time and space. These 
worlds, as Lewis (1986d) says, are something like remote planets, except that most of 
them are far bigger than planets [such as our universe], and they are not remote (p. 2). 
But neither are they close by; they have no spatial connection with our world at all. 
Neither are they far in the past, far in the future, or simultaneous with our world; there is 
no "temporal distance" between our world and the others (Lewis, 1986d, p. 2). The 
worlds are spatiotemporally isolated.  
 Also, nothing that happens at one world causes anything to happen at another; 
they are causally isolated. Lewis (1986d) says that because the worlds are causally 
isolated, "nothing outside a world ever makes a world; and nothing inside makes the 
whole of a world, for that would be an impossible kind of self-causation" (p. 3).23 Given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 What Lewis (1986d) says immediately following this bears mentioning: "We make languages and 
concepts and descriptions and imaginary representations that apply to worlds. We make stipulations that 
select some worlds rather than others for our attention. Some of us even make assertions to the effect that 
other worlds exist. But none of these things we make are the worlds themselves" (p. 3). 
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isolation, worlds also do not overlap (Lewis, 1986d, pp. 2; 198-209). That they do not 
overlap means that the worlds do not have any parts in common; for example, there are 
no two (or more) worlds that share this particular computer I am using as a part.24 
 Possible worlds are comprised of possible individuals or parts. Lewis (1986d):  
 “If two things are parts of the same world, I call them worldmates. A world is 
the mereological sum of all the possible individuals that are parts of it, and so are 
worldmates of one another. It is a maximal sum: anything that is a worldmate of 
any part of it is itself a part” (p. 69).  
So, continues Lewis (1986d), “for any two possible individuals, if every particular part of 
one is spatiotemporally related to every particular part of the other that is wholly distinct 
from it, then the two are worldmates” (p. 71). More roughly, if things are 
spatiotemporally related, they are worldmates.25 Since my counterparts and I are not 
spatiotemporally related given isolation, we are not worldmates. 
 (A brief note on counterparts. I have been discussing counterparts as if each of my 
counterparts is located at some other world, isolated from my own world. Implied in this 
usage is the thought that my counterparts are a lot like me in terms of match of origins, 
etc. However, Lewis (1986d) also says that, "under an extraordinarily generous 
counterpart relation," my human worldmates are my counterparts too (p. 232). So a 
twelfth-century peasant represents de re the possibility that I could have been a twelfth-
century peasant. The extraordinarily generous counterpart relation is just one "that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Lewis (1986d) allows for the possible exception of immanent universals (p. 2). Moreover, he discusses 
“big worlds,” which contain many world-like parts (pp. 71-73). He insists that a big world does not contain 
many worlds as parts, but is itself a world. Finally, for a more complete story of why Lewis rejects overlap, 
I refer the interested reader to Lewis (1986d, pp. 198-209). 
25 Lewis also extends his principle to worlds with different physics. Objects are worldmates at these worlds 
if they are analogically spatiotemporally related (Lewis, 1986d, p. 78). Lewis (1986d) finds analogically 
spatiotemporal relations a “messy idea” (p. 76). Anyway, I have no quibble with him here on world 
demarcation. 
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demands nothing more of counterparts than that they be things of the same kind" (Lewis, 
1986d, p. 232). So not all counterparts are spatiotemporally and causally isolated from 
each other.) 
2.4 Plenitude 
 There is a plenitude of worlds; that is, the worlds and their parts are so many and 
so varied that  
 "(1) absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world 
 is, and  
 (2) absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that 
 some part of some world is" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 86). 
 A great deal in this dissertation hangs on Lewis' formulation of plenitude, so it 
merits a more in-depth treatment. Lewis (1986d) says that the above formulation of 
plenitude "seems to mean that the worlds are abundant and logical space is somehow 
complete. There are no gaps in logical space; no vacancies where a world might have 
been, but isn't" (p. 86). But do (1) and (2) properly express plenitude? Lewis thinks they 
do not.  
 The reason Lewis (1986d) gives is that, given GMR, "it becomes advantageous to 
identify 'ways a world could possibly be' with worlds themselves. Why distinguish two 
closely corresponding entities: a world, and also the maximally specific way that world 
is?" (p. 86). But, as Peter van Inwagen pointed out to Lewis (1986d), this makes (1) and 
(2) without content (p. 86). (1) says only that "every world is identical to some world. 
That would be true even if there were only seventeen worlds, or one, or none. It says 
nothing at all about abundance or completeness. Likewise for (2)" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 86). 
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Lewis (1986d) attempts a few ways to save (1) and (2), but concludes that they "cannot 
be salvaged as principles of plenitude. Let them go trivial. Then we need a new way to 
say what (1) and (2) seemed to say: that there are possibilities enough, and no gaps in 
logical space" (p. 87).  
 Lewis (1986d) replaces (1) and (2) with the principle of recombination (POR) (p. 
87). At its heart is "the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct 
existences" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 87).26 As a first blush, POR states that  
"anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct 
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything 
else. Thus if there could be a dragon, and there could be a unicorn, but there 
couldn't be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that would be an unacceptable 
gap in logical space, a failure of plenitude" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 88).  
But there are four reasons why this formulation of POR is unacceptable to Lewis, and one 
reason why it is unacceptable to me. I will take these reasons in the following order. First, 
Lewis rejects overlap. Second, Lewis says this formulation of POR implies worlds with 
more things than there is space to put them. My problem with this formulation of POR is 
that it seems blatantly modal. Lewis’ third and fourth problems are related, and they deal 
with nomological laws and alien properties. I take these in turn, but first I should mention 
that the proviso ‘at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions’ is 
dropped until the final formulation of POR for ease of reading. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Actually, Lewis (1986e) characterizes much of his work from this period as "a prolonged campaign on 
behalf of the thesis [he] call[s] "Humean Supervenience"" (p. ix). Lewis (1986e) characterizes the thesis as 
"the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little 
thing and then another" (p. ix). Lewis (1994) elsewhere characterizes it as "the thesis that the whole truth 
about a world like ours supervenes on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities" (p. 473). For an 
early defense of this thesis see: Lewis (1986g) and (1986f). For a powerful critique of this thesis, see: Peter 
Menzies (1989). For Lewis' excellent response, see: Lewis (1994). 
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 Because of Lewis' position on overlap, it cannot be the case that specifically I 
from this world, and a specific dragon from a second world, exist at some third world. 
Each thing is a part of only one world; I am part of my world only and the dragon is part 
of her world only. 
 Lewis' (1986d) would usually invoke counterparts here, but counterpart relations 
do not really help (p. 88). If they did, POR might be re-stated as: "a counterpart of 
anything can coexist with a counterpart of anything else" (Lewis, 1986d, p. 88). The 
problem is that counterparts are based largely on extrinsic relations; and in particular, 
match of origins (Lewis, 1986d, p. 88). But intrinsic properties seem the most relevant 
when discussing me myself and that dragon. Lewis (1986d) says,  
 "[i]t might happen (at least under some resolutions of the vagueness of 
counterpart relations) that nothing could be a counterpart of the dragon unless a 
large part of its surrounding world fairly well matched the dragon's world; and 
likewise that nothing could be a counterpart of [me] unless a large part of its 
surrounding world fairly well matched [my] world; and that no one world matches 
both the dragon's world and [my] world well enough; and therefore that there is 
no world where a counterpart of the dragon coexists with a counterpart of [me]" 
(p. 88).  
 So POR should be formulated to accommodate duplicates. Lewis (1986d) defines 
duplicates "in terms of the sharing of perfectly natural properties, [with] intrinsic 
properties as those that never differ between duplicates. That [leaves] it open that 
duplicates might differ extrinsically in their relation to their surroundings" (p. 89). 
 The second problem Lewis has with this formulation of POR is that there could be 
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any number of coexisting duplicates; even an infinite number. Additionally, any 
individual could have multiple duplicates of itself at another world, whether that be two, 
28, or an infinite number. Are worlds big enough to hold very large numbers of 
duplicates? Lewis (1986d): "Should we keep the principle of recombination simple and 
unqualified, follow where it leads, and conclude that the possible size of spacetime is 
greater than we might have expected" (p. 89)?  
 Maybe. But Lewis (1986d) says that it would be "fishy if we begin with a 
principle that is meant to express plenitude about how spacetime might be occupied, and 
we find our principle transforming itself unexpectedly so as to yield consequences about 
the possible size of spacetime itself" (p. 89). For this reason, Lewis (1986d) adds the 
proviso of "'size and shape permitting.' The only limit on the extent to which a world can 
be filled with duplicates of possible individuals is that the parts of a world must be able to 
fit together within some possible size and shape of spacetime" (pp. 89-90).27  
 POR, with these considerations, might read: “counterparts or duplicates of 
anything can coexist with counterparts or duplicates of anything, and counterparts and 
duplicates of anything can fail to coexist with counterparts or duplicates of anything, size 
and shape of spacetime permitting" (Lewis, 1986d, pp. 89-90).  
 My problem with the first formulation of POR is that Lewis’ use of ‘can’ seems 
blatantly modal in nature, inviting charges of primitive modality. I think, however, it can 
be restated and that Lewis takes no damage at all.  
 Let’s see what happens when ‘can’ is dropped and replaced by the verb ‘coexist’ 
or its negation. Using the verb ‘coexist’ effectively removes modal language from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This proviso also prevents any world from having more things that it can contain. See: Lewis (1986d, pp. 
101-104). 
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formulation. 
 POR: “A counterpart or duplicate of anything coexists with a counterpart or 
duplicate of anything, and a counterpart or duplicate of anything fails to coexist 
with a counterpart or duplicate of anything size and shape of spacetime 
permitting.” 
This is formulation of POR I employ through the dissertation. 
 Lewis’ remaining two points require consideration. First, the laws of nature at our 
world are not strictly necessary, given Lewis’ Humean view about laws and causation. 
Secondly, and relatedly, there are alien properties. The shared problem of both points is 
that POR seems based on this world’s nomological principles and properties. There are 
feasibly other worlds that have parts that are not combinations of parts of our world 
(rather, counterparts or duplicates of parts of our world), and worlds that do not have our 
nomological principles. “Thus,” says Lewis (1986d), “our principle of recombination 
falls short of capturing all the plenitude of possibilities” (p. 92). However, although 
recombination from parts of our world is not sufficient to cover alien properties or 
physics, the general idea behind POR can still be applied. Here is how. 
 An alien natural property, according to Lewis (1986d), is "one that is not 
instantiated by any part of this world, and that is not definable as a conjunctive or 
structural property build [sic] up from constituents that are all instantiated by parts of this 
world" (p. 91). One need only have a version of POR that applies the same theory to alien 
worlds. All combinations of alien properties are instantiated at their respective worlds, 
“in any arrangement permitted by shape and size” (Lewis, 1986d, p. 92). 
 Finally, I should mention something about impossible worlds. One might wonder 
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if plenitude requires a proviso “preventing” such worlds. I do not think he does. Lewis 
(1986d) reasonably claims that there are no impossible worlds (p. 1).28 This falls out of 
Lewis’ (1986d) claim that each world is explained at itself (pp. 128-133). This just means 
that the chance process determines how a world comes out, and the way a world comes 
out has nothing to do with any other world. Every world, then, with regards to its physics 
and the chance process, cannot and would not generate something alien or incompatible 
with itself. Lewis’ theory should be praised for a systematic and general way of 
accounting for possibilities and thereby blocking impossible ones.29  
 Between Lewis not accepting impossible worlds anyway, and the reasonable 
assumption that no world would generate anything impossible, I think POR is fine as is 
and does not require a further caveat about impossible worlds. POR, then, is the principle 
that Lewis (1986d) uses to support “that there are possibilities enough, and no gaps in 
logical space” (p. 87). 
 Up next is Lewis' analysis of actuality. 
2.5 Actuality 
 Lewis' analysis of actuality is up next. I start with an attempted objection to 
Lewis' program based on actuality. Lewisian GMR holds a plenitude of worlds, 
spatiotemporally and causally isolated. Regardless of isolation, it is still the case that all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 There is another question lurking here. Does Lewis, by claiming there are no impossible worlds, actually 
“inhibit” possibilities? There are those who are argue that there are true contradictions. For example, 
Graham Priest (2006). Lewis (1986d) clearly thinks there can be no such thing when he follows his claim 
of there being no impossible by worlds by saying that you would speak “truly [of them] by contradicting 
yourself” (p. 1). The possibility of true contradictions is a fascinating one and worth pursuing in light of 
GMR. It is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
29 One might ask about the ontological status of imaginings, or fictitious universes in novels, that are truly 
impossible. It is an important and interesting philosophical issue. However, it is not a pressing problem for 
Lewis, anymore than anyone else. And it falls well outside the scope of my dissertation. I set it to one side. 
For Lewis on fiction generally, see Lewis (1983f) and Lewis (1983e). 
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these worlds exist, that they are part of actuality. Or as Lewis (1986d) frames this stage of 
the objection:  
 "...it is a trivial matter of meaning that whatever there is, is actual. The word 
'actual' is a blanket term, like 'entity' or 'exists': it applies to everything. Not just 
everything hereabouts, or everything suitably related to us, as I would have it; but 
everything without restriction" (p. 97).30  
So even if there are other worlds, isolated from us, they are still part of actuality. But now 
we have a serious problem according to this objection. 
 Lewis (1986d):  
 "Since everything is actual, the other worlds, if such there be, actually exist. 
Then it is not merely possible that they exist. They are not unactualised 
possibilities. In fact they have nothing to do with possibility. For possibility 
concerns not the far reaches of actuality--not even the reaches of actuality that are 
spatiotemporally isolated from us, if such there be--but rather it concerns 
alternatives to actuality. Actuality--all of it, no matter how much of it there is--
might have been different, and that is what modality is all about" (pp. 97-98) 
(emphasis mine).  
What is Lewis' response? 
 He simply does not use 'actual' as a blanket term. Rather, he interprets it as an 
indexical, on a par with words like, 'you,' or 'today,' etc. On Lewis analysis, ‘actual' turns 
out to mean 'this-worldly'. Thus, when I discuss 'actuality,' I can only be referring to the 
contents and inhabitants of a particular world. Nota bene that ‘actual' no longer is the 
same as 'existence' on this analysis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See also: Lewis (1983b) and Lewis (1986d, pp. 92-96). 
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 If actuality is indexical, other worlds and their parts can rightfully be said to be 
un-actualised possibilities. What is actual at a world, could have been otherwise in so 
many different ways. Lewis (1986d): "Possibilities are not parts of actuality, they are 
alternatives to it" (p. 99). To put it one final way, the preceding statements can say 
'possibilities are not parts of this world (wherever 'this world' is used), they are 
alternatives to it.' So, not everything is actual on Lewis' analysis. 
 The last thing I say about actuality is that isolation is doing a lot of work for 
Lewis. That is, because of spatiotemporal and causal isolation, the worlds cannot be 
considered altogether as one big world. If the worlds were causally or spatiotemporally 
connected in any way, then everything would be actual. ‘Actual' can function as an 
indexical term because there is no interaction of any kind across worlds in Lewis’ GMR. 
Lewis (1986d) says:  
 "If I were convinced that I ought to call all the worlds actual--in which case 
also I might be reluctant to call them worlds--then it would become very 
implausible to say that what might happen is what does happen at some or another 
world. If there were a place left for unactualised possibilities at all, they would be 
possibilities of a grander sort--not differences between the worlds, but other ways 
that the grand world, the totality that includes all my little worlds, might have 
been...All this would be a great defeat, given the theoretical benefits that modal 
realism brings" (pp. 100-101) (emphasis mine).  
 Thus, Lewis denies that everything is actual because ‘actual’ is an indexical term 
meaning ‘this-worldly.’ From the standpoint of any world, the rest of the plurality of 
worlds is unactualized.  
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 I said earlier that Lewis’ analysis of actuality is underpinned by isolation. I would 
like to flag this point. If isolation could be shown not to hold, the point about the grand 
world returns, especially if some kind of causal connection across worlds is implied. 
With the return of the grand world comes the point about everything being actual. This is 
discussed more in chapter 5. 
2.6 The Qualitative/De Re Distinction 
 There are two seemingly contradictory themes that have appeared so far. First, 
there is the idea that all individuals, whether a world or a part of a world, are possibilities, 
actual at some world (where ‘actual’ is an indexical term). They could have been 
otherwise. Via accessibility relations or counterpart relations, worlds and their parts 
represent ways other worlds and their parts could have been. But there is another theme 
that has not received much attention yet. 
 Simultaneous with his views on possibility, Lewis (1986d) is very clear that the 
plurality of worlds could not be otherwise: “There is but one totality of worlds; it is not a 
world; it could not have been different” (p. 80) (italics mine). Lewis (1986d) says 
elsewhere that “the character of the totality of all the worlds is not a contingent matter (p. 
126). In Section 2.2, I quoted Lewis (1986d) as saying that the sum of all his counterparts 
is non-contingent (p. 220). In fact, the strength of the claim of the necessity of the 
plurality is such that, according to Lewis’ (1986d), it could not have been the case that 
the plurality did not exist (p. 73)! That is, everything, with a completely open and not 
world-bound quantifier, exists necessarily!31 Finally, Lewis (1986d) says that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I discuss this necessity of existence a little more in Section 5.3. 
Lewis (1986d) thinks that explanations are “an account of etiology” (p. 73). I tend to agree and this theme 
of explanation being causal returns later in the dissertation. Nevertheless, with regard to the necessity of 
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plurality of worlds is a “non-contingent fact” (p. 130). 
 Given that the plurality is a necessary truth in the strongest possible sense of 
necessary, one might think that each world and each part of each world is likewise 
necessary. In fact, in chapter 3, I introduce the work of Andrew Beedle who makes 
exactly this point. Is this right? Has Lewis missed something? No. In fact, I think he 
offers and elegant and systematic reconciliation between these two conflicting themes. 
 This reconciliation is found in his characterization of the qualitative/de re 
distinction.32 The place to begin explaining this distinction is by qualitative and non-
qualitative characterizations. 
 Stephan Torre (2014) says that “qualitative properties, roughly, are properties that 
can be expressed by predicates that don’t contain a proper name, indexical, or 
demonstrative.” Non-qualitative properties, then, are expressed by predicates that contain 
proper names, indexicals, and/or demonstratives. Torre (2014) offers the following 
examples of non-qualitative properties: “Being two feet from Stephan, being taller than 
this guy, having Socrateity, maybe being an actual magician.” The first example is 
expressed in part by a proper name, the second is expressed via a demonstrative, the third 
property is expressed by using a proper name again, and the last one uses the indexical 
(on a Lewisian paradigm) ‘actual.’ ‘Actual’ operates on a this-worldly property or part, 
picking it out as an individual.33 Note that non-qualitative properties are always about a 
particular res. And that a res is always a world or a part of a world; that is, a res is world-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
everything, I think that the worst of it is not that he would try to offer an explanation, but that there could 
not have been nothing! This merits more attention than I give it here. 
32 I would like to thank Sonia Roca-Royes for discussion on this point. 
33 This is, of course, only a rule of thumb for expressing qualitative vs. non-qualitative properties. There is 
a long-standing debate about how to understand both qualitative and non-qualitative properties as well as 
how to express them. While interesting in their own right, I do wish to settle either of these debates. My 
goal is simply to explain how Lewis uses these in his work. Interestingly, Lewis does not definitively 
interpret those issues either; rather, his is a framework in which those debates might be settled. 
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bound.  
 However, a res can be given a qualitative characterization. A qualitative 
characterization of something mentions no individuals via demonstratives, proper nouns, 
and/or indexicals. It characterizes via properties and relations. 'Characterization' here 
means something like 'description.'  
 Let’s return to Lewis’ claim that the plurality of worlds is a non-contingent matter 
and could not have been different. There are only a few ways to understand these claims. 
One might think that each world and each part of a world is fixed and necessary (Beedle 
makes this mistake, as I argue for later). But if Lewis had this in mind, a lot of his talk on 
isolation and actuality would be pointless. Come to think of it, the whole apparatus of the 
plurality of worlds would be pointless because everything would be one grand world. 
Actuality is the indexical that means “this-wordly;” it refers to the world-bound nature of 
each individual. Isolation means that each world must be explainable at itself.34 Combine 
these, and Lewis gets the combined result that each world is actual at itself, but could 
have been different in so many ways, represented by other worlds and their parts.  
 Isolation also means that there are no transworld individuals, though there are 
plenty of transworld mereological sums. In Section 2.2, I explained how anything can 
have a mereological sum, but that does not thereby mean that there are transworld 
persons or individuals. So there is not a person comprised of me and my counterparts, 
though there is a mereological sum. Similarly, there is not a transworld potato that is 
made up of this potato and all its counterparts. The mereological sum of this potato 
together with all of its counterparts is real enough though; but it is not a potato or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 At least to the extent that worlds are explainable at all; Lewis (1986d) is convinced that explanation 
"terminate[s] in brute matters of fact" (p.129). I would like to thank Derek Ball for discussion on this point. 
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anything interesting.35 The demarcation line between worlds, I explained in Section 2.3, 
is spatiotemporal connectedness. Not just any sum is a world; the parts must also be in 
spatiotemporal arrangement.36 Section 2.5 explained how actuality and possibility work 
together in Lewis’ thesis for GMR. So how should we understand Lewis’ claim that the 
plurality of worlds is not a contingent matter? 
 I think that the best way to understand Lewis is by saying that the qualitative 
characterization of the plurality of worlds is necessary and non-contingent. Consider: the 
mereological sum of the worlds is itself not a world. Nevertheless, there is a sum, though 
the members of the sum are not spatiotemporally or causally unified. Thus the plurality is 
an entity, a sum; but it is not an individual in the same way that my counterparts and I are 
not a transworld person. If this is right, then there is no individual world at which there 
are all the worlds. That is, there is no res that could have been otherwise. In effect, the 
plurality can only be characterized qualitatively. Lewis (1986d): “There is but one totality 
of worlds; it is not a world; it could not have been different” (p. 80) (italics mine).  
 To sum up this discussion to this point, any world-bound individual, whether a 
world or part, could have been otherwise. This is represented by all the other worlds and 
their parts. The plurality itself is not located in any one world; it therefore can only be 
qualitatively characterized as there is no world or its part to represent de re all of it. 
Moreover, because the worlds are isolated, there is no transworld causal interaction; each 
world is causally explained at itself (see Lewis (1986d, pp. 128-133)). So the plurality of 
worlds does not and could not "determine" which worlds represent what content.  
 Note that this does not mean that every single qualitative description is necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I would like to thank Derek Ball for discussion on this point. 
36 Or possibly an analogically spatiotemporal arrangement. 
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anymore than it means that any non-qualitative description is simply contingent. De re 
modal claims are claims about what is necessary or possible for a particular thing; 
qualitative claims are not about a particular thing.37 What is in view here is the only 
characterization one could give about the plurality of worlds is qualitative since there is 
no one world in which there is everything. 
 Figure 1 below, on the next page, illustrates the qualitative/de re distinction, 
plenitude, and failure of plenitude. The first part illustrates that, necessarily, there is a 
white world, a gray world, and a black world. The specific worlds--w1, w2, and w3--are 
the worlds, the possible individuals. So, the qualitative characterization of the plurality 
does not specify which world represents what content; that is, it does not say which world 
is a w1 world, a w2 world, or a w3 world. Also, there is no world that contains all three 
worlds; there is only the mereological sum of the three worlds, the plurality of worlds. 
The figure nearest the bottom illustrates what a failure of plenitude looks like; it cannot 
be the case that there are two black worlds, and one gray world if that means the white 
world is not represented (I am, following Lewis (1986d, p. 87), agnostic on the existence 
of indiscernible worlds). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Thank you to Derek Ball for discussion on the points in this paragraph. 
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The qualitative necessity of the plurality. The box outside is the modal 
operator "necessarily." 
Below are possible permutations of the above. The diamond is the modal operator 
"possibly." Note that the qualitative necessity of the plurality does not determine 
which specific world represents which content. 	  w1	  
w1 
w1 w2 
w2 
w2 w3	  
w3	  
w3	  
Not 
w1 w2 w3	  
Figure 1 
Below depicts a failure of plenitude; an unacceptable gap in logical space. 
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So much for the general thesis of Lewis' GMR.38 There are other components to 
the theory, but what has been said is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For more discussion on possible worlds, I recommend Lewis (1973, pp. 84-91). 
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Chapter 3: Agency and Beedle’s Fork 
 I said in the introduction that my thesis is not just another “incredulous stare” at 
the theory of GMR. I said that what seems strange is how to reconcile GMR with agency. 
There is a governing intuition at work that something is strange about plenitude and 
agency in particular. The chapter proceeds in the following way. 
 I begin this chapter by discussing the “puzzle of plenitude.”39 This is done via an 
example of a three-world plurality and three agents. I argue that what makes the puzzle so 
compelling is precisely the free will concern. In particular, plenitude and agency seem to 
be at odds. Following this section, I discuss in very general terms the debate between 
agent causation and determinism (whether hard or soft). My aim is not to settle the debate 
one way or another; just to set up that all sides have coherent views and that they have 
different implications for GMR (later, I will show that GMR through POR cannot 
accommodate agent causation theories). Following this, I introduce Andrew Beedle’s 
fork against GMR.40 He offers an attempt at cashing out the puzzles of agency and GMR. 
Beedle builds his work upon that of Robert Adams (1974), but there are similar ethical 
arguments made against GMR through the decades, all of which share the intuition that 
GMR and agency have strange implications. Beedle argues that either GMR implies 
modal fatalism (which will be defined), or that any desire for good at our world is eo ipso 
a desire for other worlds to be bad ones. This is what seems strange about GMR and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 I am grateful to an anonymous marker for the term ‘Puzzle of Plenitude.’ 
40 I interpret his argument as a fork because modal fatalism and his content-of-desire argument cannot both 
hold simultaneously if he wants the desired effect. If modal fatalism is right, then who cares about the 
content of my desire? It is already determined by something other than me. However, if modal fatalism is 
wrong, then the content of my desire could be very important as I think about how to behave responsibly as 
an agent. 
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agency according to Beedle: it either implies fatalism, or makes agential choices and 
actions transworld affairs. In effect, we would have to radically re-think ourselves as 
ethical beings.  
 Although I argue that neither prong sticks Lewis, Beedle is on to something 
important. That is, there is an intuition that GMR has serious implications for agency. 
The reasons Beedle’s arguments fail as they stand are because Beedle does not take into 
account the qualitative/de re distinction, isolation, and attitudes de se. Part of the aim, 
then, of this chapter is to slough off several species of arguments against Lewis that do 
not stick, while preserving the main intuition that GMR has hidden, and most 
unwelcome, implications for agency. I then explain how one should argue for these 
hidden implications. In essence, one needs to show that POR precludes agential causation 
with the concomitant consequence that at no world in the plurality is there agent 
causation. 
3.1 Agency and the Puzzle of Plenitude 
 Consider the following case. Let us suppose that an agent, call her Clare, is 
standing at her world. Suppose there are only two other worlds in the plurality. One of the 
Clares surveys her house and realizes that she has three options for action available to 
her. They include writing a technical essay in her chosen field, baking a delicious cake, or 
constructing a lightsaber. What should she do? If Clare decides to write the essay, then 
there are two other worlds where one of her counterparts bakes a delicious cake, and the 
other counterpart constructs a lightsaber. Remember that the plurality must contain each 
kind of world (plenitude) and, because of isolation, each agent’s decision must be 
explained within the framework of her world. There seems to be something very strange 
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about this example if the GMR framework is assumed. Let us see if GMR can help 
assuage the strangeness. 
 The usual Lewisian interpretation of the Clare saga goes like this. When Clare1 
chooses write the essay, she could have chosen to bake a delicious cake or construct a 
lightsaber. These possibilities are represented de re by the other two Clares. Mutatis 
mutandis for the other Clares and their actions. 
 Far from assuaging the strangeness, this interpretation of the Clare saga only 
highlights it. What seems strange is precisely thinking about the Clares as agents, while 
acknowledging plenitude. Perhaps each Clare wanted a lightsaber. Is there a reason they 
cannot all construct one? But it is this option that is impossible on Lewis’ view. If we 
consider the Clares to be agents, and we move to the “moments of decision” at each 
world, why does plenitude hold? A Lewisian might protest that there is no reason why 
GMR has to answer this question; that is, there is no reason why a genuine modal realist 
needs to give a causal story here (from the discussion of causality in the Intro). Plenitude 
just expresses that everything is actual at some world. It does not have to explain why 
each world is the way it is, much less why the Clares chose to do what they did. 
 This response merits some discussion. But let’s begin with another three-world 
plurality without agents (or at least without candidates for agency). Suppose there are 
three worlds and one tree at each world. Each tree must fall in one of three directions: 
north, south, or east. Whichever direction the trees fall is presumably “selected” by the 
world. That is, one world is such that its tree falls to the east: perhaps because of a storm, 
maybe because the soil was blown away on one side and the tree was on a side of the 
cliff…etc. It is random in one sense that each tree falls the way it does. It is random in the 
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sense that each world selected for its outcome via the chance process. It is not random in 
another sense because the prevailing laws of physics determined which way each tree 
would fall.41 
 The story Lewis gives about this, in very general terms, goes like this. First, says 
Lewis (1986d), there is “the non-contingent fact that there are a plurality of worlds, 
wherein the alternatives are selected all different ways” (p. 130). In our example, there 
are just three alternatives, of course. Lewis (1986d) further says that there is nothing here 
that requires explanation (p. 130). It just is the case that there is a plurality of worlds. 
Secondly, though, Lewis (1986d) says that there is the “egocentric fact” that each world 
is each world and not another (p. 130). But this also does not require an explanation; it 
just is the case that each world selected for each outcome via the chance process.42 After 
all, says Lewis (1986d), “…it would arouse my suspicion to be told that, after all, 
explanation does not inevitably terminate in brute matters of fact” (p. 129). Lewis, I 
interpret, has explanation “bottom out” at the non-contingent fact of the plurality, and the 
chance process selecting for each world. If one accepts that explanations bottom out 
somewhere, I think Lewis has placed them in the right spot. 
 Now, let us take this story and return to the Clares. The reason that Lewis or a 
Lewisian might protest at my causal question about whether or not it could not be the 
case that all three Clares could construct a lightsaber is because first, he is beginning with 
the non-contingent fact about the plurality of worlds, and second, each world evinces an 
outcome of the chance process. Neither of these facts require an explanation, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I am not here attempting to settle the debate about the relationship between chance, physics, and the 
world, though this is an interesting discussion in itself. My point is just that whatever story one tells about 
the world, this story explains which way the tree falls. 
42 This section of Lewis (1986d) is dealing with the question of arbitrariness as it pertains to GMR (pp. 
128-133). But the point can be adapted to current purposes. 
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therefore my question about why each Clare could not have constructed a lightsaber does 
not require an explanation. 
 Nevertheless, I am going to insist that the “why” question is valid if we assume 
the Clares are agents in a particular sense of the term. I return to this, but first I wish to 
briefly discuss three families of theories of human agency. I am not trying adjudicate 
among them, or defend any particular one. I discuss them in service of further pinpointing 
the strangeness of the Clare saga. 
 The first two kinds of theories of human agency can be discussed together under 
the umbrella term of determinism.43 Determinism, says Blackburn (2008), “may be 
defined as the doctrine that every event has a cause. More precisely, for any event e, there 
will be some antecedent state of nature, N, and a law of nature, L, such that given L, N 
will be followed by e” (p. 141). If determinism is right, there is a puzzle from agency. 
Blackburn (2008):  
 “But if this is true of every event, it is true of events such as my doing 
something or choosing to do something. So my choosing or doing something is 
fixed by some antecedent state N and the laws. Since determinism is universal 
these in turn are fixed, and so backwards to events for which I am clearly not 
responsible (events before my birth, for example). So no events can be voluntary 
or free, where that means that they come about purely because of my willing them 
when I could have done otherwise” (p. 141).  
The two reactions to this puzzle are dubbed by Blackburn (2008) as “hard” determinism 
and “soft” determinism (p. 141). “Hard” determinism is basically the view that denies we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This part of the discussion borrows heavily from Simon Blackburn’s (2008) characterization of 
determinism (pp. 141-142). 
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are agents and denies that we are responsible for our our decisions.  
 “Soft” determinism is basically the view that determinism and agency are 
compatible. "Soft" determinism is often called compatibilism. So the difference between 
a compatibilist and a hard determinist is that the compatibilist accepts some kind of story 
about free will.44  
 A third family of views are agency theories that consider compatibilism as 
untenable.45 Since I am not arguing for any one theory over another, I set these to one 
side, and simply introduce one group of such theories: libertarian theories of agency. 
 Blackburn (2008) defines libertarianism: 
 “A view that seeks to protect the reality of human free will by supposing that 
a free choice is not causally determined but not random either…What is needed is 
the conception of a rational, responsible intervention in the ongoing course of 
events. In some developments a special category of agent-causation is posited…” 
(pp. 209-210).  
And agent-causation, says Blackburn (2008), is “[a] presumed special category of 
causation whereby agents initiate sequences of events when they act, without the 
initiation being itself causally determined” (p. 9). In what follows, I use the libertarian 
category of theories that employ agent-causation.46 
 In summary, hard determinism and compatibilist views embrace determinism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This is an oversimplified characterization. The compatibilism debates, both against hard determinism and 
among the various compatibilist views themselves, have a long history and get quite complex.For a concise 
overview of the free will/compatibilism/hard determinism debate, see: Blackburn (2008, pp. 141-142). For 
a longer, detailed discussion about compatibilism, containing its history, its arguments against hard 
determinism, and an overview of the various kinds of compatibilism, see McKenna (2009). 
45 For a very important example of such a view, see: Peter van Inwagen (1983). Van Inwagen (2008, p. 
340) also thinks that if one wants to be a compatibilist, one should "study carefully" Lewis (1986a) because 
that is the way to be one. 
46 There are other kinds of libertarian views. 
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The former says that free will is an illusion, the latter says that whatever human agency 
is, it is compatible with determinism. The agent causation view basically says that there is 
another causal force alongside the world, which is human agency as evinced through 
reason. (It is this latter view that I later cast in terms of the tuche/techne antithesis 
(Chapter 4).)  
 Based on the terms that have been defined, it is my assessment that neither hard 
determinist views, nor compatibilist views can be reconciled with agent causation. In 
effect, I think that hard determinist views and at least some compatibilist views are 
compatible with GMR. No agent causation view is compatible with GMR. I am not 
making any kind of argument at all about which of these three families of views is the 
correct one. What I am arguing for is that one of the unwelcome, hidden consequences of 
GMR is that it is not flexible enough to account for an agent causation theory of human 
agency and I am also arguing that it is not the right sort of argument to settle the debate 
anyway.47  
 I prefer the terms “agent causation,” “agency,” and “agents” when discussing the 
possibility of free will, given the philosophical baggage of the term ‘free will.’48 The 
reason I prefer this set of terms and their derivatives is because of its emphasis on human 
reason, which plays an important role in the next chapter. ‘Free will’ has connotations of 
‘doing whatever one wants’; this is a sense I am not using or discussing in this 
dissertation.49 Moreover, whenever I use the terms “agent,” “agency,” “agent causation,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 It merits mention that Lewis (1986a) is a compatibilist. For more information on this, see also Phillip 
Bricker (2006, p. 17). 
48 Not that ‘agency’ does not have philosophical baggage. Again, I recommend van Inwagen (2008) and 
van Inwagen (1983) 
49 Free will has better connotations such as 'acting without coercion.' But, again, I prefer agency and its 
derivatives. 
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and their derivatives, I am exclusively referring to the agent causation sense from 
hereafter.  
 Let’s return to the Clares and consider the moment of decision at each world 
assuming both GMR and that each Clare is an agent in the agent causation sense. 
Suppose Clare1 makes her decision to write the technical essay. It is not as if Clares2&3 
have two remaining options to choose from; there are no spatiotemporal or causal links 
across worlds. Each agent’s choice must be entirely accounted for from the vantage point 
of her own world. The strangeness here centers on how the Clares and the worlds they 
inhabit “work together.”  
 That is, according to this framework, both the world with its nomological 
principles and chance factors and the Clares through reason, choice, and action are 
supposed to be compatible with plenitude. The puzzle is this: If the Clares at least 
partially determine the world in which they live, one might think that it is possible for 
every Clare at all three worlds to construct a lightsaber. But, according to Lewis (1986d), 
this results in "an unacceptable gap in logical space, a failure of plenitude" (p. 88). So 
how much of the worlds are determined by the Clares, and how much is determined by 
the worlds themselves? How can we understand this mixture?   
 This is where I am insisting that my question about why each Clare could not 
construct a lightsaber is valid: if one mixes GMR with agent causation, one has to confess 
one more causal force, which is agency. So there is the non-contingent fact about the 
plurality of worlds, the chance process selecting for options…and agency. And agency, in 
the agent causation sense, is neither causally determined nor random. I think this is the 
puzzle of plenitude, agency, and GMR. Can GMR modal realism unproblematically 
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account for this “new force?” Is it flexible enough to allow for some story along these 
lines? The answer to both of these question, I say, is no.  
 I think the intuitive pull of the puzzle displayed in the Clare example is just what 
to make of it in light of agent causation. For the rest of the dissertation, I assume the 
agent causation view of agency since it is clearly the most at odds with Lewis’ theory. 
Again, I am not proving agent causation theories nor am I defending them. I am only 
looking at the consequences of agent causation for GMR. 
  I would like to suggest that the puzzle rests in a conflation of two kinds of 
modalities: worldly and agential. Consider. Today was rainy, but it could have been 
sunny. The meteor missed the Earth, but it could have struck it, killing all life. Clare1 
wrote a technical essay, but she might have constructed a lightsaber. The first two 
statements are clear examples of chance and nomological processes in action; they would 
have been different if the world was different.  
 The Clare example seems different. While it is true any of the Clares could have 
chosen differently, that would be only because each of the Clares chose differently, not 
because the world was different. The contingency, then, for the Clares is rooted in the 
agents themselves qua agents, not in how the worlds they inhabit are. I argue later that 
POR only captures the first kind of contingency, but not the agential kind. This is what I 
mean when I say that GMR is not flexible enough to cover agent causation theories. The 
location of the puzzle, at any rate, is the intersection of plenitude (POR) and agency. 
 In the next few sections, I introduce the work of Andrew Beedle who attempts to 
catch Lewis on a fork. I think that the main impulse of his work is the strangeness I have 
been highlighting, but I also think his arguments fail as they are. But they do so in 
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informative and instructive ways that I think sharpen the intuitions about agency in play. 
3.2 Beedle and Modal Fatalism 
 Andrew Beedle (1996) thinks, as I do, that GMR has serious implications for 
human agency. He uses a fork argument in an attempt to demonstrate that either GMR 
commits us to modal fatalism (that is, there is no agency; this is explained below), or 
GMR implies that our desires about this world being a good one are simultaneously 
desires that other worlds are worse off. The first prong of the fork is meant to show that 
GMR implies that there is no agency. This section focuses on the first argument. 
 The prong of the fork Beedle favors against GMR is modal fatalism. By ‘modal 
fatalism,’ Beedle (1996) means that the character of each and every world is fixed and 
necessary because the whole of the plurality is fixed and necessary (pp. 491-492). Beedle 
(1996) sums up the reason for this: "If the character of all the worlds is given, then the 
character of each world is given" (p. 492).  
 This seems to make sense; if the plurality could not have been otherwise, how 
could the worlds have been otherwise? Beedle thinks this has implications for agency; 
specifically, that there could be no such thing. The reason is that, since each world is 
completely necessary, then a being that thinks she’s an agent is wrong; she does exactly 
what she must do according to the world. If Beedle is right, this means that my choices 
are ultimately not part of the causal fabric of this world (or, of course, any world).50 Or, if 
my choices are part of the causal fabric of my world, they are not chosen by me, but by 
the world or system of worlds (whatever that means). 
 An example is in order, and I adapt it from Beedle (1996, pp. 492-493). I am typing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Beedle is attempting to recast the argument from indifference against GMR originally posited by Robert 
Adams (1974). 
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this section of my dissertation on a Thursday morning at the library. It seems possible 
(and actually likely) that someone is going to interrupt and distract me. Orthodoxy says 
that I have several possibilities at that point from which I can freely choose. I might 
choose to kill the person, to shake his hand, give him a stick of gum, ask him to leave me 
alone, etc. But what I do is up to me. However, according to Beedle, if GMR is right, 
then this orthodox stance is wrong because if I choose anything freely, I am thereby 
determining both the kind of possibility I am and the kind of world at which I live. But if 
the character of the plurality, and therefore all worlds, is fixed and non-contingent from 
their beginnings to ends, then I would not choose from these options when I am 
interrupted; I would simply discover what kind of possibility I am, whether I be one that 
kills or gives out gum. Beedle (1996): "The idea that I choose is illusory, because it is not 
as if I am choosing to be a member of a certain world in making any ethical decision. 
Instead, my decision just shows me which is the world that already has me as a part" (p. 
493). Seemingly, a this-worldly analogue of this point is the kind of determinism that 
states that all events, even so-called human choices are ultimately explained by the laws 
of nature. 
 But this is only a ‘seeming.’ For then Beedle (1996) distinguishes his sense of 
modal fatalism from both determinism and classical fatalism (pp. 493-494). According to 
determinism, everything proceeds from the past, and, given the initial conditions, things 
would go exactly the same way. In other words, the world is ordered in a rational way. 
But, GMR does not require any world to be rational or follow a rational causal order. 
There could be a world at which a man could be walking down a street and, in a flash, for 
no rational reason, turn into a pterodactyl. Beedle (1996) points out that GMR “does not 
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claim that each successive state of a world depends causally on the previous state” (p. 
494). I think he means just what has been said; some worlds do follow a rational order; 
others do not. Causal connections are contingent.  
 Beedle also juxtaposes his theory against a classical form of fatalism, the tragic 
Greek myth, in which Τυχη (Fate, or Fortune) oversees the big details, but the little 
details are left up to the person. For example, the hero is often told that he will suffer 
great evil or die at a particular time. He then does everything to avoid this, only to find 
that he cannot. Beedle (1996): “This sort of fatalism gives one the freedom to make little 
choices (like setting sail on a particular ship or avoiding certain foods) but claims that the 
larger elements of one’s life are rigidly fixed. In essence, any set of conditions will lead 
to the same outcome” (pp. 493-494). He rejects this as well, since it allows for a 
modicum of freedom; he argues that if GMR holds, all parts of all worlds are fixed. 
 In summary, classical fatalism allows some, smaller choices on our part to be part 
of the causal order. “Classical” determinism posits that each moment is causally 
dependent on the previous. But GMR requires neither. According to Beedle, GMR 
requires that each moment and part of any world be rigidly fixed. So modal fatalism is 
not like the Greek tragic myth because everything is rigidly fixed; and modal fatalism is 
not deterministic because it does not require a rational, causally dependent chain of 
events at every world. 
 If Beedle were right about modal fatalism, this would indeed provide a powerful 
reason to think that Lewis’ abductive argument for GMR is not on better footing than his 
rivals. But I think there is a good Lewisian response that shows why Beedle’s argument is 
far too quick. Specifically, Beedle does not account for the qualitative/de re distinction. 
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3.3 A Lewisian Response to Beedle's Modal Fatalism 
 The key assumption in Beedle's (1996) argument is that "if the character of all the 
worlds is given, then the character of each world is given" (p. 492). In chapter 2.6, I 
argued that when Lewis says the plurality is necessary, he means that it is qualitatively 
necessary. But then Beedle's sentence better read: "if the qualitative character of all the 
worlds is given, then the qualitative character of each world is given."  
 Lewis, however, is not committed to this at all because 'all the worlds' can simply 
mean 'the plurality.' Now the statement would read: "if the qualitative character of the 
plurality is given, then the qualitative character of each world is given."  
 For the argument from modal fatalism to get off the ground, the consequent has to 
mean that the qualitative character of each particular world is also given. There are at 
least two reasons why Lewis is unscathed from Beedle’s argument. First, to say that the 
plurality of worlds is qualitatively necessary just means that all possibilities are actual at 
some world.  It does not mean that just because this is a necessary truth, that the content 
of each particular world is thereby determined. An example is in order. Let w1 be a world 
with blue swans and w2 be a world with me in it sipping a lemonade. Suppose further that 
the whole plurality of worlds was just these two worlds. So, necessarily, there is a blue 
swans world and a me-sipping-lemonade world. Beedle is claiming that because the 
plurality is necessary, each world is also necessarily the way it is. So necessarily, w2 is 
the world in which I sip on lemonade and w1 is necessarily the world in which there are 
blue swans. But Lewis is not committed to this at all. W2 could have been the world that 
contained blue swans and w1 could have been the world in which I sipped lemonade. 
Lewis is only bound to the claim that the plurality of worlds contains all possibilities. But 
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this does not include the further claim that each world is thereby necessarily the way it is; 
each world could have been otherwise in so many ways! This is the qualitative/de re 
distinction in action.  
 The second reason why Lewis is unaffected by the argument from modal fatalism 
is because, according to Lewis, each world must be causally explained at itself. This is a 
consequence of isolation. Another consequence of isolation is that any world or part of a 
world really could have been different if the world had “been caused” differently. 
Beedle’s argument for modal fatalism seems to imply, however, that isolation fails. It 
seems to imply this for two reasons. First, because no worlds in the plurality could be 
otherwise. W1 and w2 are fixed for good and could never have been otherwise. To put 
this the other way around, to question if w1 could have been different is to ask if the 
plurality of worlds could have been different since “if the character of all the worlds is 
given, then the character of each world is given.” But, if the whole plurality and each 
world in it could not be otherwise, then everything is actual (see: (Lewis, 1986d, pp. 97-
100)). If everything is actual, there is some kind of connection among all things. As seen, 
though, from Section 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, and this section, there is no reason why this argument 
sticks. 
 Although Beedle’s argument does not work as it stands, the intuition of the 
argument is, I think, exactly right. Beedle (1996) claims modal fatalism implies a “moral 
defect” because it causes us to think of ourselves as agents in profoundly different ways; 
in this case, that we are not really agents (p. 488). I agree with this intuition. However, I 
think that what is really troubling Beedle is that agential contingency and “worldly” 
contingency are both supposed to be caught under the umbrella of POR. But POR really 
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only describes “worldly” contingency if there are such things as agents. So while I think 
Beedle is right to be suspicious, his argument aims its guns at the wrong target: necessity. 
He would have done better to aim at the nature of contingencies. Later, I argue that 
agency would require a different formulation than POR if GMR is to hold, but that no 
such formulation can exist. 
 In the next section, I analyze his counterfactual causation argument. 
3.4 Beedle and Counterfactual Causation 
 Let’s see if Beedle’s second prong, the argument from counterfactual causation, 
fares any better.51 Beedle (1996) announced it thus: “If we are inclined to think that my 
characterization of [GMR] is too pessimistic, I have recourse to another argument” (p. 
494). Following this, he introduces his second argument, which examines the 
implications for GMR if we are agents.  
 Suppose that our choices are causally efficacious in contradistinction to modal 
fatalism. Then, according to Beedle (1996) the modal realist account of causation goes 
something like this: “An event c causes an event e iff the closest not-c world is a not-e 
world as well. Thus...c caused e iff the conditional ‘If not-c, then not-e’ is true” (p. 494). 
So for example, suppose I am deciding whether or not to kill my neighbor’s loud dog. I 
weigh out the merits of each decision, including the ethical implications and I decide that 
I do not want to kill her dog after all. I would want to say that the deliberations are 
important because the decision I come to constrained my action; that is, because of my 
decision, I am a not a dog killer. But, as Beedle (1996) further notes, I also want the 
following counterfactual to come out true: if I had chosen differently, I would have killed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Beedle (1996) offers the following references for his account of modal realist causation (p. 494): Lewis 
(1986d, pp. 23-27), and Lewis (1986c). 
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the dog (p. 494).  
 And this is the point: for modal realist causation, my decision causes me to not 
kill the dog iff the closest world where my counterpart kills the dog is one where my 
counterpart does not make the decision not to kill.52 So my decision not to kill the dog is 
explained by "the character of the world closest to mine [being] a certain way” (Beedle, 
1996, p. 495). This seems to grant Beedle his conclusion: “The desire to have power over 
our actions amounts to a desire that some other world be a certain way” (Beedle, 1996, 
pp. 494-495). But it is important to emphasize that, for Beedle (and of course Lewis), 
counterfactual causation does not mean that my deciding to do x forces the closest 
possible world to be a not-x world.  
 Lewis (1986d), however, wants to maintain that our ethical concerns are, and 
should be, this-worldly and/or egocentric (pp. 125-128).53 There is no point in worrying 
ourselves with the conditions of other worlds since it is impossible to change them. 
Nevertheless, Beedle seems to make an interesting point. It seems that making agential 
decisions is to be concerned with other worlds. One might think that if we were all do-
gooders at this world, we would not only be “hogging” all the good, but eo ipso wishing 
evil on other worlds. 
 The next step is to discuss a Lewisian counter-response to the above. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 I am, for simplicity’s sake, assuming that the decision is followed by the action and also that nothing 
interferes with the action. For example, as my counterpart sets out to kill the dog, he is suddenly whisked 
away by the feds. 
53 Interestingly, Lewis (1986d) thinks that “[a]n ethics of our own world is quite universalistic enough. 
Indeed, I dare say that it is already far too universalistic; it is a betrayal of our particular affections” (p. 
128). 
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3.5 A Lewisian Response to Beedle's Counterfactual Causation Argument 
 The first part of the response centers on Lewis' (1986d) account of causal 
explanation (pp. 128-133).54 Suppose we wanted to explain the following: 
 (1) An apple fell from the tree. 
And suppose we were genuine modal realists. We accept that all possibilities are actual at 
some world; that "[d]ifferent worlds have all different outcomes of the chance process" 
(Lewis, 1986d, p. 129). We might then, contra Lewis, take this to further mean that 
because all possibilities obtain at some world, there is no longer any real arbitrariness or 
chance at our world. That is, we might use the vast plurality as an explanation for what 
happens here. The reason the apple fell from the tree is because a counterpart of the apple 
did not fall from a counterpart of the tree at another possible world. But this, according to 
Lewis (1986d), is a mistake.  
 We should not think that the reason the apple fell from the tree is because 
counterparts of this apple fell from counterparts of that tree at some worlds, but not 
others. This gives us no causal information; after all, the worlds are spatiotemporally and 
causally isolated. What happens at one world does not cause things at other worlds. 
Rather, we need to investigate what happened at our world. Suppose we do. We find that 
the reason the apple fell was because a gust of wind blew it down. Lewis (1986d): 
 "If we learn how hurricanes are caused, we gain some knowledge of the 
causal ways of our world. No such knowledge could have been gained just by 
thinking that some worlds have hurricanes and some do not, and that we are who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Strictly speaking, this section of Lewis' book argues that arbitrariness is not lost if GMR is accepted. 
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we are, and we are inhabitants of a world with hurricanes" (p. 131).  
 This is only the first part of a Lewisian response to Beedle. It is not enough 
though, because both Lewis and Beedle agree that GMR does not require direct causation 
across worlds. 
 The second part of a Lewisian response centers on Lewis' counterpart analysis. As 
discussed earlier, Lewis (1986d) says that “modality turns into quantification” (p. 5). In 
effect, necessity and possibility are all about worlds and their parts. The range of modal 
quantifiers is often set by our use of language. Suppose I say: 
 (2) I might have died today.  
(2) is made true by my counterparts that die "today," instead of living on. The pertinent 
counterparts represent my death. But my living did not cause them to die, nor did their 
dying cause me to live. My conditional statement is simply quantification over worlds. 
 I think that Beedle is sneaking in the idea that Lewis' counterfactual causation 
explains causation, instead of quantifying over possibilities; that particular counterfactual 
claims give causal information about causal claims. That is, what he seems to really be 
doing is saying that my choice to not kill the dog is explained by a counterpart killing the 
dog at another world. Let's reconsider the statement: 
 (3) If I had chosen differently, I would have killed the dog. 
 Beedle is concerned that my desire to avoid being a dog-killer is simultaneously a 
desire that another world is another way. This seems inherent in the following two 
statements from Beedle (1996): 
 “When I say that my decision not to cheat on my taxes caused me not to 
cheat, the counterfactual account of causation [the genuine modal realist account 
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of causation] holds that this is true iff the character of the world closest to mine is 
a certain way. It must be a world where I do decide to cheat and then cheat” (p. 
495) (italics mine).  
Secondly, and more explicitly, Beedle (1996) says: "According to [GMR], causation is a 
counterfactual and hence 'multi-world' affair" (p. 491). The italicized text from both 
quotes seems to say that what caused me not to cheat is exactly that I cheat at another 
world.55 But this is a causal explanation, which Lewis explicitly argues that he is not 
giving.56 More importantly, Lewis is very explicit that each world is causally closed at 
itself. I can only causally explain my actions from the standpoint of my world and its 
causal fabric, or nexus, however that cashes out. I cannot appeal to other worlds that are 
causally and spatiotemporally isolated from me. 
 There is a sense, however, in which “causation is a counterfactual and hence 
‘multi-world’ affair.” Causation is counterfactual insofar as what happens, what is done, 
what is experienced, may have been otherwise or was necessary. Lewis (1986d): 
 “As I touch these keys, luminous green letters appear before my eyes…and if I 
had touched different keys—a counterfactual supposition—then correspondingly 
different letters would have appeared” (p. 23).  
This is a counterfactual account of causation; in effect, if I had not typed the letter “L,” 
say, then it would not have appeared on my screen.57 Or, possibly, I might not have typed 
“L.” This becomes something like “at another world, my counterpart did not type “L.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 I am also not happy with Beedle’s use of ‘I.’ ‘I’ exist at only one world. My counterparts exist at others. 
Although there is a sense in which they are ‘me,’ they are not worldmates and the egocentric fact of my 
identity is bound only to this world. 
56 Perhaps, then, ‘counterfactual causation’ is ultimately a misleading term by Lewis’ lights. 
57 Lewis (1986d) says all this is only a beginning of a counterfactual analysis of causation. Counterfactuals 
need to be of the right sort; but how to determine this? Also, says Lewis (1986d), “not all effects depend 
counterfactually on their causes…” (p. 23). For more on Lewis' analysis of counterfactuals, see Lewis 
(1973). 
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The best way to understand this is that counterfactual causation is a way to make explicit 
the quantification over worlds that is inherent in causal claims.58 It is not a way to 
explain causation.  
 To put this in another way, the fact that I am typing the letters you see before you 
is a counterfactual and other-worldly affair in that I could have typed different letters. 
And, in fact, I do have a counterpart that types something else (maybe some poetry lines 
or something). Thus, the idea is that while this-worldly causal connections hold in virtue 
of what happens at other worlds, this does not mean that what happens at other worlds 
causes what happens here.59 
 This is the best way to understand Lewis. Otherwise, you get Lewis insisting on 
the one hand that causal explanations must be bound to a world, while on the other hand 
claiming that causation is not world-bound. 
 Beedle does agree that what happens at one world does not make something 
happen at another; but he does seem to smuggle in the idea that causation is a transworld 
affair in a way that sounds like transworld causation. Lewis (1986b) thinks, and I agree 
with him, that “to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal 
history” (p. 217) (italics his).60 But nothing about other worlds gives us causal 
information about our own world. Counterfactual causation is way of making apparent 
the possibility and necessity inherent in causal claims, not to explain (where explain 
means to give a causal history) how things happen at a world. 
 So between Lewis' counterpart analysis and isolation, Beedle's argument, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 I would like to thank Derek Ball for discussion on this point. 
59 I would like to thank Katherine Hawley for discussion on this point. 
60 Even if there were such a thing as a non-causal explanation (which isn’t likely; see Skow (forthcoming)), 
it does not matter for the purposes of this dissertation. 
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stands, does not work.  He has simply taken counterfactual causation and implied 
transworld causality.  
 Beedle might respond that all he needs is to show that my desire that my world is 
a certain way is simultaneously a desire about other worlds. He need not be concerned 
with causality since his is an ethical response dealing with the content of desire. But he 
can only make this claim about desires if there is a causal link across worlds, which he 
has not demonstrated. Here is why. 
 Lewis (1986d):  
 “The appropriate way to give the content of my desire is not by a condition 
that I want the entire system of worlds to satisfy, but by a condition that I want 
myself to satisfy. It is futile to want the entire system of worlds to satisfy a 
condition, because it is not contingent what conditions the entire system of worlds 
does or does not satisfy” (p. 125).  
That is, my desires are irreducibly de se; that is, my personal desires are not facts about 
the plurality of worlds, they are desires that only “I” have.61 If such desires are facts at 
all, they are facts about me and not the plurality, or even my own world (Lewis, 1986d, p. 
130). So whether the content of my desire is to thrust my counterparts into poverty by 
obtaining a million dollars, or to help my worldmates with the hoped-for million dollars, 
it is I myself who have either desire and this is not reducible to conditions about the 
plurality or even this world. Only I can have my desire fulfilled or not. Anyway, if I did 
desire to thrust my counterparts into poverty, this is pointless; my having a million 
dollars or not has no bearing whatsoever on their condition (isolation). For this reason, 
Lewis (1986d) compares the pointlessness of desires about the plurality with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For an excellent essay on this, see Lewis (1983a). 
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pointlessness of certain this-worldly desires: “…[S]hould I lie awake at night bemoaning 
the evils of other worlds, and should I celebrate their joys?…I suppose the cancer patients 
in the tenth century suffered as much as cancer patients do today - ought I to spend my 
time bemoaning their suffering” (p. 127)? 
 Thus, Beedle cannot have the “content of desire” argument. First, because he 
snuck explanation and therefore causation into Lewis’ understanding of counterfactual 
causation. Second, also based on Lewis’ account of counterfactual causation, he reduced 
de se attitudes to conditions about the plurality of worlds. But such desires about the 
plurality are utterly pointless because of isolation. That is, only “I myself” can have a 
desire satisfied or not; the content of my desires is best given by a condition I want 
myself to satisfy, not a condition that I want the system of worlds to satisfy. In fact, my 
desire is not even reducible to the latter. So, to wish that I had a million dollars is not the 
same thing as wishing that the plurality of worlds was such that I had a million dollars.  
 Note that even if it could be shown that isolation fails somehow, this does not 
overturn the de se point. De se attitudes still are not reducible to conditions the plurality 
satisfies. Nevertheless, the main intuition behind Beedle’s work makes sense. There is 
something weird GMR and agency. (Again, I suggest that specifically what is weird is 
that plenitude and agency do not make sense together.) 
3.6 Summing Up with Beedle, GMR and Agency 
 In this last section of the chapter, I sum up the discussion and point to what needs 
doing if the governing intuition that there is something strange about GMR and agency is 
to be put to work. While I agree with this intuition, it is also true that Lewis has many 
resources to resist many forms of arguments based on this intuition. I here review these 
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and then point to what one would need to do in order to make a successful argument. I 
conclude by saying which of these I intend to do in the next chapter. 
 There were two main ways Beedle attempts to cash out the intuition that there is 
something strange about GMR and agency. First, he argued that GMR leads to fatalism. 
Second, he argued desires involve the conditions of other worlds. They are mutually 
exclusive arguments; that is, if fatalism is true, who cares if our choices involve other 
worlds as our choices are simply “selected by fate?” We would not be responsible in any 
way. We should only care about the ethical implications of our choices and the conditions 
or other worlds if we are morally responsible agents. Thus we have Beedle’s Fork. 
 However, one cannot establish modal fatalism by saying that if the plurality is 
necessary, then each individual world is necessary. This does not take into account the 
qualitative/de re distinction, Lewis’ account of actuality, or isolation. If one desires to 
establish modal fatalism, one must show that determinism holds at each world. Well, a 
form of determinism. As seen, there is nothing in GMR that requires each successive 
stage of a world to be causally dependent on preceding stages. 
 As to the other prong of the fork. De se desires are not reducible to what 
conditions the plurality of worlds does or does not satisfy. Any argument that attempts to 
show that the content of our desires is simultaneously a wish that the plurality of worlds 
satisfied certain conditions fails because of this. Any argument that attempts to show we 
should be ethically concerned with other worlds fails because of isolation and irreducibly 
de se considerations. Moreover, any argument that interprets counterfactual causation as 
giving an explanation of our actions fails because explanations are causal and there is no 
transworld causality (isolation again). 
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 Nevertheless, as I have said before, I do think there is something intuitively right 
about Beedle’s claims. Specifically, there seems to be something about GMR that directly 
affects our sense of agency. Lewis (1986d) deals with such ethical arguments in a section 
on moral indifference (pp. 123-128). There are three ethical claims in particular that he 
looks at: those from Robert Adams (1974), Larry Niven (1981), and J. J. C. Smart (1984). 
The first two map on to Beedle’s sense of fatalism; the last one can be mapped to his 
counterfactual causation concern.   
 Here, I briefly look at the main claim of each, and how Lewis responds. 
Following this, I examine what is behind such claims, concluding that the problem is the 
conflation of two kinds of modality. 
Robert Adams (1974) is concerned with our response to evils:  
 “I think that our very strong disapproval of the deliberate actualizing of 
evils…reflects a belief in the absolutely, and not just relatively, special status of 
the actual as such. Indeed, if we ask, ‘What is wrong with actualizing evils, since 
they will occur in some other possible world anyway if they don’t occur in this 
one?’ (p. 216).  
Larry Niven (1981), in a short story, says that even knowing about a plurality of 
worlds would make life meaningless.62 Lewis (1986d) interprets Niven: “Every decision 
you ever make is made in all the myriad ways it might be made. It is made one way by 
you, other ways by your other-worldly counterparts who are exactly like you up to the 
moment of decision” (p. 124). This includes massive life decisions, such as whether or 
not to commit suicide, or deciding what to eat for breakfast, or which Columbo rerun to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Lewis (1986d) is careful here (p. 125). There are a few ways to interpret Niven in his story. Lewis just 
takes the one that is most germane to the line of argument against GMR. 
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watch again. So who cares what you do?  
Finally, J. J. C. Smart (1984) is concerned by the fact that GMR requires a collapse of 
a universalistic ethic (pp. 88-89). He says that by GMR’s lights, one could only be 
concerned about what happens at one’s world, and not the whole plurality. He says this is 
problematic because it is too much like the this-worldly analogue of caring too much 
about one’s own tribe or nation, rather than the whole of humanity.  
Lewis’ responses can be summarized in the following ways. The reason why I should 
care whether or not I kill myself is because my desire to live or not cannot be satisfied 
vicariously through a counterpart. Only I can satisfy this. My attitude here is irreducibly 
de se. Moreover, Lewis (1986d) says that “an egocentric [de se] want is…a different 
thing from a want as to how the world should be…The first sort is not reducible to the 
second” (p. 125).63 There are two points to pull from this. First, Adams’ question “what is 
wrong with actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible anyway” is a 
direct attempt of reducing egocentric desires to desires about the world. So what is wrong 
with actualizing evils here is that I would become an evildoer. Is this something I desire 
for myself? If not, then I should not be an evildoer. The second point is similar. The 
reason GMR should not drive me to indifference about anything I do is because my 
egocentric desires are not reducible to my desires about the plurality of worlds (if such I 
have). That is, if I desire to live, no counterpart fulfills this desire on my behalf. 
Alternately, just because a counterpart of mine kills himself does not mean that my 
decision to live is meaningless because it matters to me.  
 With regard to Smart’s point, Lewis (1986d) is perfectly happy with the collapse 
of a universalistic ethic and he thinks that a this-worldly universalistic ethic is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 For more on this, see Lewis (1983a). He defends this point in great detail there. 
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problematic (p. 128). But the salient point for my purpose is that Smart thinks it detracts 
from GMR that it cannot accommodate a universalistic ethic; that agents across worlds 
cannot be concerned for each other’s welfare. Beedle’s counterfactual causation 
argument turned on the content of desire, claiming that it is morally repugnant to desire to 
hog the good for ourselves. The point is a small one. I bring it up only to make some 
points. Before making them, I should say that Lewis (1986d) has more to say on Adams, 
Niven, and Smart and I have left out some of his arguments (pp. 123-128). But I think 
Lewis has responded very well to his critics on these matters and has rendered their 
points harmless. 
 However, the governing intuitions behind these ethical arguments have not been 
rendered harmless. Note the similarities between Beedle’s modal fatalism argument and 
the arguments from Niven and Adams. They all turn on the idea of agency being false, or 
at least that our agential actions are meaningless since they all occur. Smart’s point maps 
onto Beedle’s counterfactual causation point. These two arguments turn on moral 
responsibility and its reaches; they assume we are agents. The first group of arguments 
(modal fatalism, Niven, and Adams) decry GMR for taking away the importance of 
agency, or even saying we are not agents in the case of Beedle’s argument, while the 
second group (Beedle’s counterfactual causation argument and Smart) say that GMR has 
devastating consequences for our sense of moral responsibility.  
 What I think is really driving all these arguments is that there are two kinds of 
modality in play and GMR only accounts for one of them (I defend this as a possibility in 
the next chapter). There is “worldly” modality and agential modality. Worldly modality is 
based on nomological principles and the chance process of a given world. So, the reason 
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why this tree grew here and not there is under this sort of modality. Or why friction 
produces heat at all the worlds that obey our laws. Agential modality covers why I chose 
to become a philosopher instead of a doctor. Or why a soldier chose to run from the 
battlefield in cowardice, rather than facing the enemy with courage. I contend that the 
reason why GMR sounds fishy is because it assumes modality is of one kind. This means 
that the reason why I chose to be a philosopher evinces the same kind of contingency as a 
rock rolling down a hill and narrowly missing a lake. 
Beedle’s modal fatalism argument is only interesting if we want to think of ourselves 
as agents in some way. This is because modal fatalism’s this-worldly analogue is fatalism 
or determinism. If we think that chance and our nomological principles are sufficient to 
account for everything, including human action, then why be worried about modal 
fatalism? Beedle’s interest in modal fatalism was precisely because it undermines us as 
agents. But note what is undermining us as agents; assuming that possibilities are of one 
kind. Even his counterfactual causation argument turns on attempting to make sense of 
agency through this one kind of modality. It does so because it takes plentitude (POR) 
and looks at some of the effects it might have on agents. He stops short of transworld 
causation, but he does say that if we are agents, then wishing our world is one way 
involves simultaneously a desire for other worlds to be other ways.64 That is, the one kind 
of modality and agency has weird effects for us as agents. I think a more fruitful 
approach is to consider what would have to be true about the world if there were agents. 
And there is good reason to think that if there are agents, then another sort of modality is 
in play. If this is right, then it is fruitful to examine POR to see whether or not it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Later I argue that plenitude and agency are incompatible. But if they were compatible, there would still 
be the problem of a transworld causal issue. And if that were true, then everything would be actual. 
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flexible enough to accommodate agential modality. In fact, we shall see that POR is not 
flexible enough to accommodate agential modality.  
Can GMR “bounce back?” Perhaps GMR just requires some kind of agential POR, 
APOR, to add to POR in order to account for both kinds of modality. Unfortunately for 
GMR, I argue that there can be no such principle to express plenitude for agential 
modality. And even if there were such a principle, it would involve a transworld causal 
force. If there is such a transworld causal force, then isolation fails and everything is 
actual. Effectively, this would bring Niven’s and Adams’s concern back; we would have 
to be concerned about the state of other worlds. But worse, this would be the “grand” 
failure of GMR that Lewis spoke (Section 2.5).  
The rest of this dissertation, then, defends the following series of claims. There are 
two terms I use that require explanation before listing the claims: worldly modality and 
agential modality.65 Worldly modality is about the possibility and necessity of non-
agents. Some examples include the location of a lake, the sort of planet Earth is, the 
number of planets in the solar system, etc. Whatever could be said about their 
possibilities, or what is necessary about them will be based on the chance process and 
nomological principles of a world. Agential modality is about the possibility and 
necessity inherent in the actions of agents. Some examples include why I decided to be a 
philosopher rather than a doctor, why a virtuous person chose not to commit murder, 
rather than to commit murder, or why an artist chose one technique instead of another. 
Whatever could be said about agential possibilities, or what is necessarily true of agents, 
cannot be based on the chance process or nomological principles of a world. Here are the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In this next chapter, these terms are replaced with the more precise terms of “tuche-based” modality and 
“techne-based” modality. 
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claims. 
 (1) According to many theories of agency, agential actions are of a qualitatively 
different kind of modality than chance-based modality. 
 (2) But POR in GMR only accounts for “chance-based” modality. 
 (3) No similar POR-like principle can be given for agential modality that does not 
collapse into POR. 
 (4) But even if a POR-like principle could be found, it would violate isolation 
because such a principle implies transworld causation.  
 (5) If no POR-like principle can be found AND there is agential modality, then 
plenitude fails or at least is not guaranteed (which is the same as failure for GMR). 
 (6) If there is no such thing as agential modality, and POR is correct, then GMR 
implies no agency at any world; necessarily, there is no agency (from (2)). 
 (Conclusion) If there is agency and GMR holds, then plenitude fails, or isolation 
fails (from (4), (5)). But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then necessarily there is 
no agency at any possible world (from (2), (3), (6)).  
My adaptation of Beedle’s fork is this. If there are agents, then either plenitude cannot 
be guaranteed or isolation fails; but if there are no agents, then there are not any agents at 
any possible world. So, what Beedle et al should have been arguing for are two 
fundamentally different kinds of modality and that one is not reducible to the other. 
Figure 2 on the next page is an illustration of Beedle's Fork reforged: 
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Figure 2 
GMR	  
Without	  Agency	  
Necessarily,	  no	  agency	  at	  any	  possible	  world.	  
With	  Agency	  	  
Plenitude	  fails	  or	  is	  not	  guaranteed.	   Or	  isolation	  fails.	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Chapter 4: The Τυχη/Τεχνη Antithesis, Agency, and the 
Problem with POR 
 The aim of this chapter is to establish (1) from the end of the last section. I 
establish (1) by discussing a view of agency based on a feature of ancient Greek 
philosophy called the τυχη (tuche)/τεχνη (techne) antithesis. The theory of agency I use 
based on this antithesis not only captures the agential idea that we in a very real sense 
determine what sort of world we inhabit, but also has two additional benefits. First, it 
offers the vocabulary and concepts to better articulate the two kinds of modality (worldly 
and agential) I mentioned previously. Secondly, the antithesis is based on the 
interrelatedness of tuche and techne. Thus, it takes as a starting point that, if agents exist, 
there is a perennial tension between chance and physics on the one hand, and agency on 
the other. To be clear, I am not defending the view. I am only discussing it as a vehicle to 
establish the two kinds of modality while doing justice to the idea that agency is a 
coherent view. 
4.1 The Tuche/Techne Antithesis and Agency 
 Agent causation theories contend that human agency is a causal force in 
determining a world. Often, however, it gets to be an unclear issue where agency picks up 
and the “body” leaves off. That is, how should one think of the connection between an 
agent and their bodily processes, the latter presumably an example of the nomological 
principles of the world in action? This is not a question I wish to settle here; there are a 
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number of theories on this subject.66 However, I shall select such a theory as an example 
to demonstrate that worldly modality and agential modality are not reducible one to the 
other. 
A helpful paradigm for thinking about agency and the world comes from the ancient 
Greeks. The Greeks, of course, were not all of one mind about agency.67 Nevertheless, 
there was a shared piece of furniture in the ancient Greek mind; it is the τυχη/τεχνη 
(tuche/techne) antithesis (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 155-162).  
Τυχη (tuche) is the Greek word for chance and/or contingency and/or fate and/or 
luck. Martha Nussbaum (2001) also uses the term “ungoverned contingency” as included 
in the concept of τυχη (p. 155).68 ‘Ungoverned contingency’ can be roughly construed as 
‘the world left to itself.’69 Tuche, then, includes what we would call nomological 
principles (ungoverned contingency) and chance. It might seem strange to include the 
nomological principles under the blanket of tuche, but there was a good reason for this. 
Tuche is defined against techne. What the world does on its own very often interferes 
with our plans and applications of reason. For example, I might throw the best, most 
accurate pitch baseball has ever seen; but then a gust of wind, which is entirely explained 
by nomological principles, throws it off course. This is the sense in which the world left 
to itself is included the concept of tuche. But note this also defines a sense of chance. We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Historically, the locus classicus of the mind/body distinction is Rene Descartes (1971). I do not imply 
that most think him correct about his substance dualism. But his view of the physical/material is just as 
popular as ever. However, other views consider the person as having mental and material powers; such 
views do not think the "body leaves off" and the "agency picks up." Rather, the person displays material 
and intellectual powers. For excellent discussions of such views, see: John Greco and Ruth Groff (2013). 
For an example of someone who thinks that Descartes was right about the mechanistic view of the body, 
see: M. F. Burnyeat (1992). 
67 For example, compare the Stoics who believed in a rigid fatalism on the one hand, and on the other, say, 
Plato or Aristotle who accepted more of an agent-causal picture. 
68 See also: Anthony Preus (2007, p. 269). 
69 For more information about the τυχη/τεχνη antithesis, I commend Nussbaum (2001) to the interested 
reader (pp. 155-162). 
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often say, even in our contemporary vernacular, that the gust of wind that wrecked my 
baseball pitch was the result of chance. What we really mean is that we had no 
knowledge and could not plan against the gust of wind should it arise.  
There are other senses of chance that are covered under tuche as well. Returning to 
the nomological principles of a world, we might think that even our current physical laws 
might have been different. However the world was formed, chance played a role in the 
way our universe is “governed” by its nomological principles.70 So, even if our world was 
purely deterministic or fatalist, tuche is playing a role. It is playing a role in how the 
nomological principles came to be at the beginning of the world; they could have been 
otherwise.  
 But if our world was deterministic or fatalistic, then the sense in which the world 
“upsets our apple cart,” like when the wind blows my pitch to one side, would not be a 
relevant sense of tuche, since this implies that the world upsets our techne. But, that being 
said, if the world was deterministic or fatalistic, both my pitch and the gust of wind, 
although determined by the world, still evince tuche insofar as these things are the result 
of the world left to itself. Finally, tuche would of course include the notions of 
probability, such as when I roll a die, and, if the world is indeterministic, the kind of 
probability and chance operative in this case would also fall under the umbrella of tuche. 
I turn now to the antithesis of techne. 
Tεχνη (techne) is translated in various ways into English, says Anthony Preus (2007), 
including ‘art,’ ‘craft,’ and ‘skill’ (pp. 258-259). Nussbaum (2001) also points out that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 I am here modernizing what could fall under the umbrella of tuche. Most Greeks thought some kind of 
demiurge created the world; thus the world was not a result of chance, but of a techne. However, if one 
does not believe the Earth was the result of an applied skill (techne), then it is tuche that largely determined 
how things are. 
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‘science’ is also a translation of this word (pp. 159-160). A τεχνη, says Nussbaum (2001) 
“is closely associated with practical judgment or wisdom…with forethought, planning, 
and prediction” (p. 160).  Examples of τεχνες are math, shoemaking, dancing, flute-
playing, painting, wrestling, etc. The thing they all have in common is that they evince 
reason. And reason, when applied to the world, reduces or eliminates the effects of tuche 
in any of the relevant senses discussed above. Consider: left to the wintry elements in 
Siberia, a human body would die. The τεχνες of fire-making and clothes-making mitigate 
the effects of the world. 
 This is the sense of agency I intend to use for the rest of this dissertation. Agency is 
an application of reason that reduces or eliminates the effects of contingency and chance 
in the world.71 In other words, applied reason is a causal force in the world alongside 
chance and nomological principles. In other words, at least some human acts determine 
what sort of world this is, alongside the laws of nature.72 
There is another important point to make about the tuche/techne antithesis. As seen, 
these two terms are defined off one another. Part of what made this tension so interesting 
to all Greek philosophers was precisely that human agents are products of tuche to some 
degree and mitigate said tuche to some degree. Some examples are in order. I was born in 
a place and time when I had several career options available to me, such as being a 
philosopher, a doctor, or a linguist. But I could have been born in a place and time when I 
never would have heard of philosophy, say. Thus, tuche “determines” in a very real sense 
where I am and when I am. However, wherever and whenever I find myself, presumably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Nussbaum (2001) says: “Techne…is a deliberate application of human intelligence to some part of the 
world, yielding some control over tuche” (p. 160). 
72 Note that this is a different sense of agency than “doing whatever one wants” that is often associated with 
free will (though unfairly). 
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I am in possession of reason and can do things in accordance with it. So I may not have 
heard of philosophy, but I might choose from among other careers; or, even have a career 
determined for me, depending on the culture I’m in. But who I decide to be is in my 
hands, and very much incorporates reason and actions based on reason. Related to this 
last, suppose I was born in a household of vice, where swindlers of all sorts raised me. 
Tuche placed me there, but I might choose to “rise above it,” in the sense that I do not 
wish to be a swindler. This will require good judgment, applied wisdom, and actions that 
accord and evince such good judgment and wisdom. Or even suppose that there is a patch 
of land ideal for the building of a house. Tuche determined the sort of land that it is; the 
possessor a techne must choose to place a house there. So again, part of the great interest 
of this antithesis is that it assumes already that tuche determines much of what happens to 
us.73 
Different Greek philosophers and schools of thought, such as Aristotle, Plato, and the 
Stoics, all had different accounts of this interplay and I need not adjudicate among them 
here. The salient point is just that if there is such a thing as agency, then it will be 
“intertwined” with tuche. My task is not to explain how this works exactly, but to show 
that whatever agency is, if it exists, it is not “covered by” POR. Moreover, again, I am 
not defending the tuche/techne antithesis. It is just a helpful tool for spelling out the 
implications of agent causation. 
I think this is as good a view as any of agency, and it maps nicely onto the subject 
matter of this dissertation. Moreover, it gives me resources to stop using the vague terms 
“worldly modality” and "agent modality." Modality that is based on nomological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Of course, one reason why agency sounds crazy to so many is because it implies another causal force in 
the world other than tuche. 
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principles and chance can be tuche-based modality where as agential modality can be 
captured in the term techne-based modality. 
In the following sections, I explicate the two kinds of modalities at work. 
4.2 Tuche-Based Modality 
In the last section, I introduced the tuche/techne antithesis. In the following two 
sections, I say more about each side of it, beginning with tuche-based modality. 
I introduced many senses of tuche-based modality in the last section. What ties them 
all together is that where there is no ability to apply a techne, there is only the world left 
to itself. This is the theme I am going to develop in this section.  
Let’s begin with the easiest sense of tuche; chance and nomological principles. I will 
use the modified, contemporary sense I discussed in the last section that does not assume 
a demiurge. Also, by 'chance', I have in view the probabilistic sense, or the random sense 
displayed when, say, throwing a die. The following statements exemplify different kinds 
of chance and nomological principles: 
 (1) I exist, but I could have not existed. 
 (2) The speed of light in a vacuum is 286,282 miles per second, but it might have 
been faster. 
 (3) The lightning bolt struck this tree, but it could have struck that tree. 
(1) exemplifies certain existence claims. I was caused to exist, but I might not have. 
Actually, (1) is more complex as we shall see later in this section. But we can substitute 
that sentence for something like “Earth’s moon exists, but it may not have existed.” The 
idea is that many existential claims are modal in the chance and nomological sense. (3) is 
supposed to be an example of a random event. The lightning bolt could have struck this 
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tree, or me, but instead it struck that tree.74 (2) is nomologically necessary for our world. 
Lewis (1986d) defines nomological necessity this way:   
“…it is nomologically necessary, though not unrestrictedly necessary, that friction 
produces heat: at every world that obeys the laws of our world, friction produces 
heat. It is contingent which world is ours; hence what are the laws of our world; 
hence which worlds are nomologically ‘accessible’ from ours; hence what is true 
throughout these worlds, i.e. what is nomologically necessary” (p. 7).  
 (1)-(3) depend on a combination of chance and physical laws to whatever degree 
or mixture. Such forms of chance and nomological possibility and necessity are handled 
well in Lewis’ formulation of GMR. At some world (or worlds), much like this one, my 
counterpart is absent. At some world (or worlds), there is no light/light travels 
differently/etc. At some world (or worlds), the counterpart of the lightning bolt struck 
something other than the counterpart of the tree. In the dialectic of this dissertation, these 
kinds of contingency and necessity claims are τυχη in action. That is, they are all the 
result of ungoverned contingency. Moreover, I think that POR “expresses” the possibility 
and necessity in chance and nomological principles without problem. 
 However, there are other phenomena that are categorized under tuche, some of 
which I mentioned in the last section. Nussbaum (2001) discusses three of these senses: 
 “First we notice the vulnerability of…people to luck [tuche] through their 
attachment to vulnerable objects and activities….[Second], [w]e see, too, that the 
values pursued by these people are plural…[Third], [w]e see, finally, the power of 
passion and need to derail practical planning…Those are the diseases. The correct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Of course, this is not an entirely random event. The pathways between the clouds and ground are also 
influenced by many laws of physics. However, there does seem to be an element of chance in lightning bolt 
formation. Anyway, I usually discuss nomological principles and chance together. 
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techne of practical choice would seem to be the one that could cure them” (pp. 
158-159).75  
I will say something more about each of these senses.  
 As to attachment to vulnerable objects and activities, a good example is pursuing 
love. This is not entirely in one’s power. Insofar as this is true, is insofar as one “puts his 
own life at the mercy of luck. He does not know or control his future” (Nussbaum, 2001, 
p. 159).  
 The case of plural values can be explained via this example. Suppose I wish to 
pursue philosophy, be a good husband and father, excel at Mixed Martial Arts, and 
become an excellent singer. Without a techne of practical reasoning, these various 
‘values’ will “collide.” As Nussbaum (2001) puts it, without a techne of practical 
reasoning, there is “no clear way of rendering…[these values]…commensurable or of 
avoiding serious conflicts among them” (p. 159). So, while all of them may be 
worthwhile pursuits, some are probably more worthwhile than others given my situation. 
What could unify these various values and worthwhile pursuits in life is the techne of 
practical reasoning. By unify, I mean that this techne would rightly distinguish among 
and correctly assess the worth of each particular value. The one who applies this techne 
would then be able to order their lives in accordance with reason, rather than being 
thrown every which way by the conflict of these values.76 To put this point of plural 
values in another way, there are probably thousands of “worthwhile” pursuits. How 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Nussbaum’s (2001) chapter is about a science of practical reasoning. She is interpreting the Platonic 
dialogue “The Protagoras.” The main point of dialogue is that Socrates is offering a new techne of practical 
reasoning that can mitigate the moral decay and problems associated with the moral sense of tuche. 
Nussbaum’s work is spelling out what sort of techne this would be. 
76 I do not mean to imply that without this singular techne, all have a life of chaos and undiscipline. That is 
too extreme the other way. The problem with current plural values, according to Socrates, is that they still 
eventually lead to deep problems and ultimately place us too much in the path of tuche. 
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should one go about selecting any of them? 
 Finally, the power of passion (roughly, the emotions) and need are also placed 
under the “auspices” of tuche. Many Greeks believed passions to be antithetical to the 
pursuit and actions of reason. Through their emotional power, passions would often “take 
over” a person’s mind, directing their steps outside reason, such that the overcome person 
would leave all other pursuits behind. But the passions were also thought to be the effects 
of nature (tuche) within us. It is the task of reason to subdue them and bring right order to 
one’s life.  
 Even bodily needs, like sleep, can place one at the mercy of tuche. For an 
example, I could be in the middle of the desert with a few other people, lost, and trying to 
find our way back and devise methods for survival. If I am too focused on my parched 
throat, I am not focusing on what needs doing in order to live; I am under the control of 
tuche. 
 Different situations in life can evince one or more of these senses. For example, 
suppose I am a house-builder, working at a house-building firm. Suppose that the 
company requires a series of layoffs and that I am on the chopping block. I lose my job. 
From my perspective, tuche has been cruel. However, one might point out that it was not 
the world left to itself that lost me my job, it was other agents. True. However, companies 
and firms in the Western world depend on markets. While any company or firm attempts 
to control markets (using technes), this is often done by manipulating the passions of 
pursuits of persons. Insofar as firms and clientele are not using reason to direct their lives, 
is insofar as they are at the mercy of external forces. Returning to my job, there was 
nothing I could do about it. But many tuche-related issues certainly pertain to it. The 
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modern colloquial expression of this is something like “life happens.” ‘Life’ here means 
tuche. However, what is always within a person’s control is how they react morally to 
‘life.’ Suppose I rob a bank and pay off my house because of what ‘life’ was doing to me. 
Or suppose I receive it well and do not compromise my integrity.The important part of 
this example is not pinpointing where techne leaves off and tuche begins; rather it is to 
show their interrelated state.  
 Admittedly, these three senses of tuche sound strange to contemporary ears. I 
suppose one contributing reason is that we are not accustomed to thinking of ethical or 
moral issues as having strong connections with chance.77 But then again, we do. We often 
consider the following factors when considering how people behave and act in life: 
biology, environment, upbringing, socioeconomic concerns, country, etc. All of these 
have elements beyond human control; I cannot decide who I was born to or where, etc. 
But insofar as I choose to deploy a techne of reasoning is insofar as I can mitigate these 
effects.  
 Moreover, we can see the direct connection between biology, say, and 
nomological and chance factors. If the world determined our biology through physics and 
chance, then we would behave only in accordance with our biology, with its passions, 
needs, and askew sense of value. It is through the application of technes, and hopefully 
the techne of practical reasoning that we can mitigate the effects of the world left to 
itself.78  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I’m sure there are many other reasons as well. I am not here defending or adjudicating among such 
reasons since I am not defending agential causation from the ground up. I am only explaining a theory of 
agent causation. 
78 In Nussbaum’s (2001) discussion, humans do not yet have the science of practical reasoning. Socrates, 
like Prometheus, is bringing it as a gift. But interestingly, technes can, to paraphrase Nussbaum (2001), 
save us, transform us, and also help us to attain our ends while often reshaping the ends themselves (p. 
156). 
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 Finally, none of this implies a black-and-white view of the life governed by 
reason, or the life dominated by tuche. That is, I have been using “extreme” examples to 
highlight the senses of tuche discussed in the literature. I am sure one could think of 
many “gray” examples where the clear effect of tuche and the mitigating effects of techne 
are not so clear.79 
 In sum, tuche-based modality deals with the necessity and possibility inherent not 
only in physics and chance, but also biology and the chance factors of moral contingency. 
 Returning to Lewis’ formulation of POR, I am also willing to admit that it extends 
to the social and moral considerations of tuche above. Tuche is the world left to itself, and 
the world left to itself does include our biology, the environments we grow up in, the 
times we live in, etc. In other words, the extent to which my job depended on tuche is the 
extent to which I am happy that chance factors and physics at another world generate a 
counterpart of myself who was not on the chopping block. In chapter 5, I argue that 
Lewis’ formulation of plenitude, POR, can only express tuche-based modality.  
 The subject of the next section is the possibility of a whole other kind of 
modality; techne-based modality. If there is another kind of modality that cannot be 
expressed via POR, then GMR has a serious problem. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In fact, such gray areas are, in part, what motivated thought about this puzzle to the various schools of 
thought. Socrates, inter alia, was making the point that where such grayness existed under the present 
techne-schema, was the extent to which tuche dominated. The pieces of evidence Plato is using for this 
conclusion are the advanced moral decay, wars, pestilence, and many other horrors that befell Athens. 
Anyway, the point is this. Without this “master techne” that Socrates is offering, the various technes are not 
“unified” in a way that would make the living of life the most reasonable. I am here unconcerned with the 
“master” techne of practical reasoning, although interesting in its own right. My main concern is defining 
the antithesis and showing where the demarcation lines are. 
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4.3 Techne-Based Modality 
 In this section, I examine techne-based modality. That is, I discuss the necessity 
and possibility inherent in the applications of reason. In what follows, it might appear that 
I am defending the view, but I am not. I am only drawing out the implications of agency 
via the antithesis. This section also shows what it means for agential decisions to evince a 
qualitatively different kind of causation than physics and chance (point (1) from Section 
3.6). This section also establishes the possibility that if there is a techne-based modality, 
then there are serious consequences for plenitude as expressed by POR. 
Below, I introduce techne-based modality via five examples of modal claims that are 
resistant to Lewis’ analysis of plenitude. What they all have in common, according to the 
techne-based view, is that they are not reducible to the causal nexus of a world. Consider: 
 (1) The gondolier skillfully maneuvered the gondola around the corner, despite 
 the gusty winds, which could have made him crash. 
 (2) Margaret, wanting to escape the canyon in which a fallen boulder had pinned 
 her arm, cut off her arm, cauterized it, and sought medical help at the nearest 
 town, although she could have chosen to wait for help. 
 (3) Edgar Allan Poe wrote The Raven, but he might not have if he had chosen 
differently. 
 (4) Stanley refrained from killing Maxton because he did not want to go to 
 prison, but, had Stanley decided otherwise, he could have killed Maxton. 
 (5) Svyatoslav’s character was such that necessarily, he could never rob a bank. 
 Before discussing each in turn, it is helpful to discuss what they all share in 
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common. The idea is that any deliberate act of reason to garner some kind of control over 
tuche evinces a techne. Thus, a master of any techne is always displaying agency.80 Each 
of my characters, with the exception of poor, despised Maxton, has the skill (or techne) 
set necessary to act well against tuche. In what follows, as I discuss each particular 
example, a richer picture of both tuche and techne are developed.  
(1) is about the application of a techne against the forces of nature. Left to 
ungoverned contingency, the gondola would have crashed into the wall. The gondolier 
mitigated the effects of the world. True, he might have failed in his task and crashed into 
the wall anyway, but not for a lack of effort; not for a lack of an attempt of applying his 
techne. Left to itself, left to the forces of nature, the gondola would certain have crashed.   
Related to this last point is how the techne was learned. Presumably, our adroit 
gondolier spent a long time perfecting his craft, learning to apply his skill in different 
circumstances and weather conditions. This included the transitions from basic 
maneuvering to more streamlined and complex maneuvering. Thus, his techne was the 
result of a deliberate and sustained effort, preempted by many decisions and concomitant 
actions to stay with the techne, over the course of years. During this extended period, he 
probably could have chosen to give up and try his hand at other technes, such as bank 
telling or becoming an astronaut.   
Even more broadly, the world left to itself would not have produced any gondolas, 
much less a gondolier. Moreover, the world left to itself would not put people in 
gondolas. They would need to walk, or drive, or perhaps take an airplane. Walking 
evinces a techne, as does driving. Any mechanical device for transportation displays 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Agency is not necessarily limited to this. Perhaps technes are simply a subset of agential actions. I am 
simply sticking with the view on offer. All I need is that some actions are agential, however that is cashed 
out. 
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techne. So there is an interwoven pattern of tuche-related phenomena, and  the technes 
applied against it. Here are just some of the technes in action: gondola-building, gondola-
maneuvering, walking, driving, car building, language, finance (the passengers had to pay 
the gondolier; he had to know how to count and do math), even construction (the building 
that they would have crashed in to was not put there by tuche). 
While (1) may exemplify an “interwoven pattern” of tuche and techne, (2) is meant as 
an example of the “collision” of tuche and techne. I discussed earlier that one of the 
reasons why the Greeks found the antithesis so interesting was the interrelated nature of 
tuche and techne. For example, tuche plays a large role in not only the sorts of creatures 
we are (I did not decide to be human), but in the range of technes we can employ 
(because I am human, I cannot fly). Another reason the antithesis was popular was 
because of the violence with which tuche can operate.  
Seneca (2004), discussing and personifying fortuna (that is the Latin for tuche), said: 
“fortune [tuche] does not just capsize the boat: she hurls it headlong on the rocks and 
dashes it to pieces” (p. 45). The literary flourishes aside, the point is that the world often 
disrupts and interrupts a person or persons in action. Hurricanes, tornadoes, volcanoes are 
all obvious examples. But so are things like falling rocks, lightning strikes, etc. Margaret 
was exercising her hiking techne when disaster struck. The world caught her off guard in 
a painful and violent way. It was through exercising her set of hiking skills that she 
settled on her decision. Probably, one of the reasons why she cut off her arm was because 
of how far away the nearest town was. Help was unlikely to come. 
There is more happening in this example too. Not only is her ability to canyon climb 
the result of years of practice (as in the previous gondola example), there are also layers 
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of technes involved here, such as amputations and cauterizations (and city-building!). Are 
these part of the techne of mountain climbing, or are they separate technes? What I mean 
is this. Does the techne of mountain climbing (and even gondoliering) comprise many 
other technes? Do these further technes have other technes comprising them, leading up 
to the ‘master’ techne of practical reasoning from the last section? Whether or not technes 
can be construed in hierarchies with a series of constituent, lesser technes, or as 
altogether separate, is an interesting issue. But I must set it to one side. The main thing I 
want to draw attention to is that our technes are not usually in isolation.  
Decision-making itself is a techne insofar as it leads to an action that mitigates the 
effects of tuche and the ability to put other technes in action through a techne is a 
complicated affair. A while back, a popular thought about agency and action was that, up 
until an agent selected and enacted an action, the biological laws of nature were in force; 
this was temporarily suspended when the agent employed her faculty for action. But if 
the view on offer is correct, a typical day is chocked full of greater and lesser technes, 
such as brushing one’s teeth, driving in traffic, walking to the office, etc. There is a 
constant interplay, then, between agents and tuche, either in the sudden form of (2) when 
the boulder fell, or in the case of everyday life. Or, to put it another way, tuche would not 
result in teeth being brushed or offices being walked to; left to themselves, teeth would 
rot and no offices would be occupied.  
(3) is an example much like (1). The reason it made the list was because it 
exemplifies the use of language as a techne, which merits mention. All competent 
language users exhibit a perspicacity in a wide array of concepts. To obtain such a 
mastery requires years of linguistic development through reading, speaking, writing, and 
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generally, engaging other language users. Novels, philosophical writings, poetry and 
other kinds of writing can employ a very high level of linguistic prowess. But so does 
speaking with friends, giving speeches, or listening in on a lecture about a topic that is 
altogether new for the listener. Language is a ubiquitous, yet an arduously obtained, 
techne among human beings. The point is that--if the agent causal view is correct--the 
world left to itself would not produce linguistically competent agents.81 This is 
accomplished through training, hard work, and, in short, the application of various 
linguistic technes. 
Examples (4) and (5) are moral examples and deal in character. I will be using the 
language of virtue, but really I think what is said could be adapted to most ethical 
theories. One of the governing ideas about moral action is the idea that one must practice 
to become moral. A good analogy is going to the gym. When one first starts, her muscles 
are weak and flabby. Over time, she gets stronger. Similarly, practicing moral actions is 
like lifting weights; the more you do it the stronger you get. The germane point is that 
agents act in accordance with their sense of the moral, and their sense of the moral is 
developed as they act morally.82 
 As is well-known, the Greeks were not of one mind about many things. But 
something most of them agreed on (except those like the Sophists), was that philosophy 
is the ‘art of living well.’ Art here is of course a techne, and ‘living well’ had very 
definite moral connotations. Now, because techne is involved here, that means there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Well, this could be a contentious claim. A hard determinist would definitely disagree. But one does not 
need to be a hard determinist to find this claim strange. Anyone who believes in the theory of evolution will 
find what I wrote strange; did we not evolve linguistic capabilities? To be clear, I am not emphasizing how 
language came to be, just how we become proficient users. This involves many technes on the current 
view. 
82 Even if one thinks that we just have a since of the moral simpliciter, agents still act in accordance with 
their sense of the moral. 
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some kind of way tuche can “interfere.” One way tuche could interfere is this. Suppose a 
man was watching as a boulder careened down a mountain on its way to a child. He 
might be terrified of losing his own life, but morality demands he saves the child.83 The 
point is that the boulder is “hurled by tuche,” but it offers a chance to exercise morality 
and thereby counteract what the world does left to itself. 
The subject of (4), Stanley, does not seem to be a person of high moral fiber. It 
appears to be the case that the reason he lets Maxton live is only because he does not 
want to go to prison. But suppose he were to find out that he could kill Maxton and never 
get caught? Suppose, for example, that he discovers a poison that, when administered, 
would leave no trace in the body that a toxicology report would find. Suppose, too, that 
he just “chanced” upon this poison because he read something about it. Tuche here is the 
main reason why Stanley would choose to become a killer. He “accidentally” stumbled 
on something that would drive him to murder Maxton. Moreover, Stanley is driven by 
‘life’ more than virtue or character. The reason he first was not going to kill Maxton was 
only because ‘life’ would imprison him; not because it was wrong or that Maxton was a 
fellow-creature, but only because of what ‘life’ would throw his way. He is tuche-
controlled in at least these two ways. Stanley, many ancients would say, is a creature that 
tuche has more influence over because he has not worked on the techne of life, or 
philosophy.  
(5) is meant as an example of the "virtuous person", who, on principle, would never 
steal from anyone, much less a bank; necessarily, he never steals. Call him Svyatoslav. 
There is no possible world at which Svyatoslav would rob a bank. Suppose, too, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Let’s just suppose morality demands this. And anyway, one can change the example to suit. Suppose the 
child was about to fall off a bunkbed and the man was right there. He could just catch or stop the child 
without being in danger himself. 
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Svyatoslav had a rough childhood and still chose the path he is on. Despite powerful 
obstacles to his non-thieving quality, he chose this way of living. Each day, he made 
decisions against the background he came from. This sort of person would never choose 
to rob a bank because this would violate their very character. There are no circumstances 
or situations, that is there are no contingencies, that would result in this choice because 
this person is a practitioner of the art of life. The very point of a techne is to mitigate 
contingency. This example exemplifies again the interwoven nature of tuche and techne. 
While tuche ‘decided’ where he came from, it could not decide his character because this 
is the result of the techne of philosophy. Like all technes, one must choose to learn/apply 
it. 
In sum, according to the view on offer, techne-based modality deals with the 
necessity and possibility inherent in agential actions. These actions are not rooted in 
chance, contingency, the world, etc…in short, tuche. They are based on the reasons why 
an agent acts, especially when they could have chosen different. Some courses of action 
are necessarily chosen in virtue of character; other courses of action could have been 
selected had the agent so acted. These actions of an agent, when they are an act of applied 
reason, mitigate and in some cases eliminate the effects of tuche.84 If the foregoing is 
right, then there is a very important consequence.  
 Techne-based modality is not reducible to tuche-based modality precisely because 
technes mitigate and/or eliminate tuche. This is the basis for the ontologically distinct 
kinds of modality at work. This means that the reasons why an agent could or could not 
act in some way is not contingent in the same way as why lightning struck this tree, when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 In these ways, this theory also satisfies the intuitive notion that at least some of our decisions as agents 
are the results of choice and reason, not chance and nomological processes. Moreover, I see no reason why 
it is not reconcilable with many theories of agency. 
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it could have struck that tree. (Note also that saying that techne-based modality is not 
reducible to tuche-based modality is equivalent to the agent causation claim that agents 
are causal forces along with the chance process.) 
 There are some senses in which Lewis might agree with me that techne-based 
modality is not reducible to tuche-based modality and some senses in which we will parts 
ways.85 I want to focus on only one of each here. One way of cashing out a point of 
agreement is through Lewis’ attitudes de se. Lewis might take me to mean by techne-
based modality just that agential desires are not reducible to the world or plurality of 
worlds. So suppose I desire to become an expert clown. The best way of describing this 
desire is that having the quality of clown-ness is something I want for myself, not 
something I want the plurality of worlds to satisfy (which includes, of course, my world). 
So I act in accordance with the desire and begin the climb to clown-hood (I am here 
assuming an uncomplicated link between desire and action). Anyway, we both agree that 
my desire to be a clown is not reducible to a quality the plurality of worlds has, or even 
what qualities my own world has. Or, in terms of the talk so far, my desire for clownhood 
is not reducible to tuche. Agreed. I do think that techne-based modality explicitly 
involves attitudes de se. But there is much more happening in techne-based modality than 
just desires, and this is where I can introduce the point of disagreement. 
 While techne-based modality does indeed involve attitudes de se, this is not all 
there is to say about it. Let us return to the Clares. Baking a delicious cake, constructing a 
lightsaber, and writing a technical essay are all tasks that evince various technes. 
Presumbaly, each Clare, through a deliberate act of reason, acts on a decision she comes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ultimately, though, I think Lewis would reject the agency causation view on offer with its implications 
of ontologically distinct kinds of modality due largely to his compatibilist views. 
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to through said reason. Could the Clares have chosen to do otherwise than they actually 
did? Yes, but why? Is it because the world (tuche) was such that each chose what they 
did, whatever ‘choose’ means? Or was it because each Clare employed her set of technes 
and settled on a course of action? If some kind of agent causation theory is correct, it is 
the latter. But if it is the latter, does plenitude as expressed by POR sufficiently account 
for techne-based modality? I think it does not, as I defend in the next chapter in Section 
5.1. For now, I say the following. 
 With regard to (1) from the end of Section 3.6, decisions agents make and enact 
through various technes (including moral technes) are not explainable by the “world left 
to itself.” That is, assuming any agent causation theory, for such techne-based actions, 
physics and chance do not offer the relevant causal information required to answer the 
question of why an agent did a particular thing (such as bake a delicious cake). Even if 
the world does provide a “backdrop” against which agents decide (such as where I was 
born and who I was born to), this does not fully account for the actions of agents. 
Therefore, the possibility and necessity inherent in such actions is fundamentally 
different than the possibility and necessity inherent in things like why the sun is as big as 
it is, or why an earthquake struck here and not there. But POR mentions nothing about 
deliberate acts of reason; it seems only to describe the chance process. Could Margaret, 
with her arm pinned to the canyon, have chosen to draw a fake mustache under her nose 
with a black Sharpie? According to POR, this seems possible and therefore actual at 
some world. If it is truly possible, it seems very random and unconnected with reason and 
the situation around her. But if it is random, then it is by definition not an act of reason; it 
is not evincing masterful applications of technes. In short, such an action seems to evince 
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the effects of tuche rather than techne. 
 It should also be reiterated that although I have used tuche-based and techne-
based modality as my terms of choice, I have not said anything different than that agents, 
at least sometimes, choose a course of action that is not determined by chance or physics. 
This should be broad enough to capture any agent causation theory. 
 Finally, in summary of this chapter, what all the techne-based decisions and 
courses of action have in common is the deliberate, reasoned act of the agents which 
mitigates tuche. So the unifying factor of all techne-based modality is reason. The 
unifying factor of all tuche-based modality is chance. Agency understood understood by 
this antithesis pressures POR in GMR. 
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Chapter 5: Beedle’s Fork Returns 
 In this chapter, I defend (2)-(Conclusion), which recasts Beedle’s fork to more 
devastating effect. Here again are (2)-(Conclusion): 
 (2) But POR (Principle of Recombination) in GMR only accounts for “chance-
based” modality. 
 (3) No similar POR-like principle can be given for agential modality that does not 
collapse into POR. 
 (4) But even if a POR-like principle could be found, it would violate isolation 
because such a principle implies transworld causation.  
 (5) If no POR-like principle can be found AND there is agential modality, then 
plenitude fails or at least is not guaranteed (which is the same as failure for GMR). 
 (6) If there is no such thing as agential modality, and POR is correct, then GMR 
implies no agency at any world; necessarily, there is no agency (from (2)). 
 (Conclusion) If there is agency and GMR holds, then plenitude fails, or isolation 
fails (from (4), (5)). But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then necessarily there is 
no agency at any possible world (from (2), (3), (6)). The chapter proceeds in the 
following way. 
In Section 5.1, I first argue for (2) by demonstrating that POR cannot account for 
techne-based modality; it only accounts for tuche-based modality. I then lay out the fork: 
Lewis can attempt to find some principle like POR for agents, or he can abandon agency 
altogether. Neither are good options.  
 In Section 5.2, I discuss what would be implied for GMR if there was agency. 
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Assuming some kind of agential POR (APOR), I show that even if there could be such a 
thing, it would imply a transworld causal force. Call it Mysterion. Whatever agents do 
would not only have consequences for other worlds because of what I will call the 
transworld butterfly effect, but all worlds would thereby be actual since APOR would be 
a transworld causal principle. This gets me (4). I also argue in this section that really, no 
such principle like APOR could exist because it collapses back into POR. The main point 
here is that POR is more or less an expression of chance (tuche-based modality); but 
agential modality is not (entirely) chance-based. This gets me (3). If there are agents, and 
Lewis wants to keep isolation, then plenitude fails, or at least cannot be guaranteed. This 
is because worlds and agents can determine themselves. If agents partially determine 
their own worlds without a principle of plenitude, then there is no reason to posit a 
transworld force. This gets me (5). 
 In Section 5.3, I consider the ramifications for GMR if Lewis denies agency. This 
is not a good option either. This is because GMR implies that not only does our world not 
have agency, but at no possible world could there be agency. The problem is that GMR is 
the wrong sort of argument to settle this (6). This gets (Conclusion). If there is agency, 
then plenitude fails, or at least is not guaranteed. But if there is no agency, then there is 
no agency at any possible world. This is Beedle’s fork reforged, based on, as it ought to 
be, POR and agency.86  
5.1 POR and Tuche-Based Modality 
 The aim of this section is to demonstrate that POR only “works” for tuche-based 
modality in defense of point (2) from Section 3.6. I proceed in three basic steps. First, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See page 67 of this dissertation for the illustration of the fork. 
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address a claim that Lewis makes about questions of causation being irrelevant to the 
counterfactual analysis of causation in GMR. I argue that, if there are agents, then it is 
not irrelevant. Secondly, I show that POR cannot accommodate agent causation theories 
and is only amenable to tuche-based modality. Finally, I motivate a counter response on 
Lewis’ behalf, suggesting that perhaps a broader sense of counterpart relations might get 
Lewis what he needs from POR.87 I conclude, however, that this still does not address the 
concern about POR.88 
 Lewis (1986d) makes a telling statement in a section of his book where he defines 
predetermination according to GMR (pp. 7-8). Predetermination, posits Lewis, is best 
treated by putting together nomological accessibility restrictions and historical 
accessibility relations. Lewis (1986d) defines nomological necessity as all the worlds that 
have our physics (p. 7). Historical necessity, as Lewis (1986d) defines it, is the class or 
set of worlds that are identical up to a certain point (p. 7). Then Lewis (1986d) offers this 
telling statement: 
 “Putting together nomological and historical accessibility restrictions, we get 
the proper treatment of predetermination-a definition free of red herrings about 
what can in principle be known and computed, or about the analysis of causation. 
It was predetermined at his creation that Adam would sin iff he does so at every 
world that both obeys the laws of our world and perfectly matches the history of 
our world up through the moment of Adam’s creation” (p. 8) (italics mine).  
 Why would Lewis say that the analysis of causation is a red herring? Let me 
reiterate the pertinent parts of the theory of GMR. First, POR is not a principle that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 For more information on this, see Lewis (1986d, pp. 220-248). 
88 I should also say that when I discuss agency, I am not defending agency. I am saying what would have to 
be true of GMR and POR if there were agents. 
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explains (remember on Lewis’ view, explanations are always giving causal information 
about something) how the plurality “came to be.” With this in view, there is already one 
reason why an analysis of causation would be a red herring in his account of 
predetermination. It is that GMR is flexible enough to give an account of 
predetermination without having to settle on any theory of causation. Did God make the 
all the Adams sin? Did each one of the Adams choose to? None of these are questions 
that GMR needs to settle (or so Lewis thinks). It is supposed to be enough, that whatever 
story of causality you give, GMR has the resources to accommodate it. Thus, GMR to a 
large degree, can be agnostic about causal theories. Well, largely agnostic; it is explicitly 
bound to the claim that whatever causation amounts to, it must be explained at a world 
and that a world is sufficient to explain what happens there. But this clearly leaves a lot 
of room open for discussion. 
 Pace Lewis, an analysis of causation is not a red herring. It is actually of utmost 
importance if there are agents. Did Adam sin because God made him sin? Did all the 
Adams across the plurality of worlds sin because of their own choice, or because of some 
other reason? Let us return to the Clares. POR is supposed to be agnostic on why a 
lightsaber was constructed, why a technical essay was written, and why a delicious cake 
was baked. Moreover, isolation “ensures” that whatever the causal story is, a world is 
sufficient for all explanations.  
 But why does Clare1 chose to be an academic, Clare2 a Jedi, and Clare3 a baker? 
A Lewisian response might begin along the lines of Clare1 desiring to be an academic, 
Clare2 a Jedi, and so on. These were conditions they wanted themselves to satisfy. So my 
‘why’ question is not really important because whatever the causal story is, GMR just 
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requires plenitude as expressed by POR. However, attitudes de se do not help here, if 
there are agents (I am assuming that desire preceded the actions of the Clares). While the 
desires of the Clares are not reducible to the world, it is still sensible to ask why the 
Clares have the desires they do.89 Was each Clare born with the particular desires? Did 
the desires take shape as they lived their lives, making small moral decisions that 
culminated in the people they were/wanted to be? But now we are going in circles: Lewis 
insists that there is no need to answer these questions, and I am insisting that we do. So I 
am going to bring this situation to its sharpest point by the following question. 
 Could each of the Clares have chosen to bake a delicious cake at their respective 
worlds? There is a sense in which Lewis would say yes, and that this is represented by the 
Clare that baked the delicious cake. But that is not the sense in which I am asking the 
question: I mean could Clare1 herself, Clare2 herself, and Clare3 herself, at each world, 
bake a delicious cake? And Lewis must answer no, on pain of losing plenitude. This is 
where the fireworks are and this is precisely the puzzle of plenitude in GMR. And, again, 
what generates the puzzle is the possibility of agency. I would like to unpack what I think 
is a driving intuition. It seems that, if the Clares are agents, there is no reason to suppose 
they could not each bake a delicious cake at their respective worlds. Lewis has simply 
taken modal language, like “could have,” and claimed that modality is really 
quantification over worlds and their parts.  
 This Lewisian analysis is supposed to answer the intuition about the Clares this 
way. From one point of view, the intuition is exactly right. Each could have baked a 
delicious cake. But this 'could have' from the previous sentence is really quantifying over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 I am assuming that the Clares are very, very similar counterparts of each other; similar match of origins, 
etc. So, if their desires are in part shaped by technes, this is of serious causal interest. 
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worlds and their parts. So, what makes it true that each could have baked the cake is just 
the Clare who does in fact do it. Mutatis mutandis for the construction of the lightsaber 
and the technical essay. So GMR has satisfied the intuition, while offering a lot more in 
terms of possibility and necessity via POR.  
 But has Lewis satisfied the intuition? No, he has bypassed it. If we plug in the 
framework from chapter 4, we can see why. First, two kinds of modality are in play if 
there are agents: tuche-based modality and techne-based modality. These are not 
reducible to the other. When it seems reasonable to think that each Clare could have 
baked a delicious cake, what is meant is something like, “could each Clare, employing 
her array of technes reasonably conclude that baking a cake was the best course of 
action?” Or, in other words, Clare’s choice is not grounded in chance, tuche, but reason, 
which mitigates the effects of tuche. This has interesting hidden consequences for the 
formulation of POR. It seems to imply that what seems so strange about POR is that it 
reduces agency to chance. That is, it seems tantamount to saying that each world and 
each choice of each Clare just came out that way, these were just consequences of the 
chance process. 
 This point can be made in another way. Let us assume for the sake of argument a 
principle of recombination for agents. Let’s call it APOR (Agential Principle of 
Recombination). However it is formulated, it would have to include the idea that 
whatever an agent can do, an agent in fact does. Then the usual counterpart theory story 
is inserted.  
 With this partial construct of APOR in view, let us return to the Clares. Each 
Clare must choose one of three options: baking a delicious cake, writing a technical 
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essay, or constructing a lightsaber. Each Clare can reason through the choices before her, 
but each choice must be made at some world in accordance with APOR. Suppose that 
Clare1, Clare2, and Clare3 all choose to construct a lightsaber. APOR would say that this 
is a failure of plenitude of agential choices. Indeed it is. So it is impossible.  
 But now we have a very strange scenario. Chance was not enough to explain the 
action of each Clare, so we developed APOR. Let us look at the “moment of enacting the 
decision” at each world. Since chance is not enough to explain the decisions of the Clares 
(hence APOR), some force other than the world has to select for each possible outcome; 
call it Mysterion. So, in some mysterious way, Mysterion ensures that each agent is free 
to choose a course of action, while also ensuring that each course of action is selected 
across the plurality. 
 I return to this subject in a later section, but for now, I conclude that, if I am right 
about Mysterion, this really just collapses back into POR. If the chance process (which 
includes physics) is why each world comes out the way it does, and Mysterion is a 
parallel force that explains why each agent chooses what they choose, then Mysterion is 
something very much like chance. So much so, in fact, I think there is no functional 
difference. And that is the point of the example of APOR. Something other than agents is 
really selecting the choices, and this something is chance; or, the way the world is and 
what the world does. So the reason that POR cannot account for agential actions is 
because agential actions are not reducible to the chance. POR, then, rules out agency 
theories. But perhaps Lewis has a way out. 
 I have been using other worlds and other Clares to make my point. Maybe I 
should be considering this-worldly counterparts too. Lewis (1986d), in his section 
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entitled Against Haecceitism, argues that counterparts can be this-worldly (pp. 220-248). 
Lewis (1986d) is talking about the possibility of being “poor Fred,” a this-worldly person 
who can also be considered as a counterpart (p. 231). Lewis (1986d) says that Fred is: 
 “…my counterpart under an extraordinarily generous counterpart relation, 
one which demands nothing more of counterparts than that they be things of the 
same kind. Any property that one of my counterparts does have is a property that I 
might have; being Fred - being literally identical with him - is such a property; 
and so there is a sense in which I might have been him” (p. 232).90  
 Let us suppose a Clare is at our world and all other humans here are her 
counterparts under the relation that we are all human. Suppose Clare constructs a 
lightsaber.91 Penelope writes a technical essay. Hank bakes a cake. Maybe we can tell a 
story about how the choices of other agents, whether this worldly or at other worlds, 
represent what we could have done. We can replace talk of counterpart relations that 
emphasize similar origins et al with the much wider counterpart relation above. Thus, 
Hank represents for Clare that she could have baked a delicious cake. Remember virtuous 
Svyatoslav, whose character was such that he could never rob a bank. Perhaps this-
worldly bank robbers represent this possibility for him.  
 There seems to be a lot to commend this sort of story. Most salient to this 
discussion is this. If Svyatoslav could never rob a bank, then other this-worldly agents 
who do rob banks, could represent this possibility for him. This seems to allow room for 
other agents to come to different techne-influenced actions without interfering with those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Lewis is arguing against haecceitism in this section of the book. I am not concerned here with 
haecceitism. I am just taking a piece of his argument and adapting it to present purposes in an attempt to 
motivate another story on Lewis' behalf. 
91 I know, I know; this is not possible here! 
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of others.92 Can some such story help Lewis and preserve POR? 
 Unfortunately, no such story will help Lewis and preserve POR. This is not a 
question of introducing more counterparts, but of ontologically distinct kinds of modality. 
Let’s return briefly to APOR. APOR collapses back into POR precisely because chance is 
the governing “force” behind worlds and their outcomes. If one retains POR and accepts 
the generous counterpart relation of being of the same kind, the question remains: do 
agents determine their world and mitigate tuche to some degree or not? The problem is 
that POR implies that it is the world, the chance process, that determines everything. The 
extent to which there is agency, is the extent to which agents determine their world via 
technes. And the extent to which an agent determines their world is the extent to which 
POR fails to capture this. So the problem is not solved by introducing more possibilities 
through a more unrestricted counterpart relation; the question on hand is how possibilities 
are determined. Those that are enacted via agency evince an ontologically distinct form 
of modality from those possibilities that are determined by chance and nomological 
principles. 
 An important consequence of POR being unable to capture techne-based modality 
is that plenitude is not guaranteed. Or possibly, plenitude does not hold. The reason is 
that no world fully determines what agents do. Therefore, there can be no principle of 
recombination that generates all agential outcomes. So all the Clares in the three-world 
plurality really could all make lightsabers, just as we all at our world could choose not to 
be murderers.93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 I said earlier that those who are overly dependent on events outside their control are more dominated by 
tuche. This does not mean that there is no technes being used by such people. Tuche and techne are 
intertwined. 
93 The relevant technes here are lightsaber construction, and the art of life. 
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 This gets me (2) from Section 3.6. POR only expresses tuche-based modality. I 
have also made the further claim that no such principle could be found for agency (point 
(3)), but I defend this in the next section. For now, though, I am poised to lay out the two 
prongs of Beedle’s fork reforged. Lewis has two choices here if he wants to keep 
plenitude. Either he can accept some story of agency and come up with another principle 
like POR that somehow accounts for agential acts, or he can deny techne-based modality 
altogether.94 These are the two prongs of the fork. As to the former, I do not see how this 
can be done without positing some strange, transworld force like Mysterion. But even if 
he could find such a principle, he loses isolation. Prong one, I think, is the worst scenario 
for GMR. I discuss this more in Section 5.2. 
So that leaves Lewis the option of rejecting any kind of techne-based modality. Lewis 
then would have to give a story about how science seems to indicate that the chance 
process is sufficient for all explanations in the world, including persons. Further, this 
tuche-based view of the world is all that is possible. Even further, he would also have to 
argue that all possible worlds must ultimately be tuche-based. Then, he can have 
plenitude unproblematically because POR would encapsulate the only kind of modality 
there would be, which is tuche-based modality. But there are serious consequences for 
selecting this option, which I discuss in Section 5.3. The main consequence is that 
necessarily, there is no agency at any world. 
I turn now to the consequences of the fork. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 To be clear. Lewis is a compatibilist and I am agnostic as to whether or not some theories of 
compatibilism can accommodate the agent causation intuitions. I assume for this dissertation that agent 
causation and compatibilism are not compatible. Given the general compatibilist thesis, I think it very 
likely that Lewis would reject techne-based modality. So Lewis would want nothing to do with this first 
prong of the fork. Nevertheless, given the discussion to this point, he does have the option available. 
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5.2 Consequences for GMR with Agency 
 In this section, I defend (3)-(6) of my argument. I look at the consequences for 
GMR if there is agency at any world. I assume for the sake of argument that some sort of 
APOR could express plenitude for agential choices. If some sort of APOR could express 
plenitude, then this would imply a violation of isolation, because APOR requires a 
transworld causal force.95 Call it Mysterion. If there is transworld causation, then 
isolation fails. If isolation fails, then the ‘everything is actual’ argument returns (see 
Section 2.5). However, I then argue that there can be no such APOR that does not 
collapse back into POR.96 If no such principle can be found, and there is agency, then 
plenitude either fails or is not “guaranteed.”97  
 So let us suppose for the sake of argument that something like APOR was 
coherent. That is, some version of APOR unproblematically expresses plenitude for 
chance and agency. Let’s call this transworld causal force ‘Mysterion’ because it is still 
mysterious how APOR would work. It could be that there is some sort of agential 
analogue to chance that ensures plenitude, or it could be that somehow it expresses 
plenitude for what agents themselves, through technes, do. Regardless, the story below is 
agnostic on which of these encapsulates what Mysterion is. Anyway, if I demonstrate that 
Mysterion is present at all worlds, it is enough to show that isolation fails and everything 
is actual. 
 Here is one way of expressing APOR in GMR: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 This is to demonstrate (4) from my main argument: "But even if a POR-like principle could be found, it 
would violate isolation because such a principle implies transworld causation." 
96 This demonstrates (3) from my main argument: "No similar POR-like principle can be given for agential 
modality that does not collapse into POR." 
97 This demonstrates (5) from my main argument: "If no POR-like principle can be found AND there is 
agential modality, then plenitude fails or at least is not guaranteed (which is the same as failure for GMR)."  
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 (APOR) Mysterion “adjusts” each world just enough so that plenitude holds. 
 I framed (APOR) in terms of Mysterion because Mysterion is to (APOR) what the 
chance process is for POR. Also, I used 'world' instead of 'agents,' because of the 
transworld butterfly effect (discussed below), which basically means that all worlds are 
affected by agents. Finally, from Section 5.1, this formulation of (APOR) preserves the 
point that “whatever an agent can do, an agent in fact does.” I think that (APOR) covers 
most, if not all, possible ways to account for agency and plenitude in GMR. Let us take a 
"strong" sense of (APOR), which would mean something like Mysterion is the main force 
behind each agent's action. This is a major "adjustment," but it is still in the scope of 
(APOR). Likewise, a "weak" form of (APOR) would mean something like Mysterion 
"tweaks with" agential actions just enough so that plenitude holds. If I can demonstrate 
even a weak form of (APOR), that is enough to establish that agency and plenitude means 
isolation fails. To preserve isolation, either agency must go (see Section 5.3), or plenitude 
must (Point 5 of my argument). 
 Let's return to the Clares. Perhaps Mysterion just “helps” the Clares a little bit; it 
“tweaks” things just enough so that each decision is selected and acted upon by the 
agents. Each Clare is mostly free to choose, it is just that plenitude must hold. At the 
"moment of decision" Mysterion "acts on" each world and agent in such a way that 
plenitude is "enforced." All this sounds quite harmless with this "weak" sense of 
Mysterion in view.98 However, important questions immediately appear here. What role 
are the agents playing? What role is Mysterion playing? What role is the chance process 
playing? Before answering these questions, two important points about Mysterion require 
attention. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Actually, it sounds crazy. But what in metaphysics doesn’t? 
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 First, Mysterion is present at all the worlds. Whatever it is doing to ensure techne-
based plenitude, it does at all possible worlds (in this case three).  Second, it must be 
causal because it "works with" agents. Agential actions are always causal. Here is an 
example that brings out both of these points about Mysterion. 
Here I explain what I call the transworld butterfly effect. This time, let’s assume a 
ten-world plurality, each of which contains a tree that must fall over in one of ten 
directions (perhaps because of the wind or something). Each world is exactly identical up 
until the moment that each tree falls over. Suppose further that only one of these worlds 
contains an agent. Call him Ken. Suppose Ken can choose, via his technes, one of ten 
options.99 He can fell a tree this way, that way, a third way, a fourth way…all the way up 
to a tenth way. Ken elects to push the tree over the sixth way. Ken himself selects this 
option via reason and his interrelated set of technes, including his lumberjack techne. 
Remember, Ken has done what he has done via technes, and technes are not reducible to 
tuche. The trees at the other nine worlds must fall down in the remaining ways!  
 The strangeness of this is hard to overstate. It means that Ken took the sixth way 
off the transworld market, so to speak, leaving the other worlds with the remaining ways. 
No matter what happens at those nine other worlds, not one of them contains a tree that 
falls in the sixth direction. Why? And I mean ‘why’ in the most causal of ways. What I 
mean is that explanation is not going to bottom out here by saying the other worlds just 
are the way they are because of the chance process.  
 The reason why the remaining worlds do not contain trees that fall in the sixth 
direction is because Ken, through technes, chopped down a tree and made it fall in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 I am aware that this is technically a failure of plenitude because plenitude would mean that ten agents 
select one of the ten options at each world. This example, though, is about the ubiquity of the causal force 
Mysterion. So, I am setting concerns about plenitude momentarily to one side to make this point. 
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sixth direction. Whatever initial conditions there are at those other worlds, whatever the 
story is on how the other worlds came to be such that the sixth way was absent, each 
world is at least partly determined by Ken's action. This would be true if there ten worlds, 
as in this example, or one hundred, or a thousand, or a billion. The reason why the sixth 
way never appears in the rest of the billion-world plurality is because of the one agent 
Ken.  
 This is the transworld butterfly effect “in action” if there is Mysterion. So the 
reason Mysterion is causal is because the other worlds, even those without agents, are 
partially determined by Ken. More sharply, at the "moment" when all the tree fall in their 
directions, the trees at the not-Ken worlds do not fall in the 6th way because of Ken. 
There are (at least) two important points this example shows. 
 First, and perhaps the strangest, is that Mysterion apparently also "tweaks" with 
tuche. What I mean is that the worlds devoid of agents are tuche worlds. Well, they are 
almost tuche worlds. The chance process must now select from the remaining options that 
Ken took away. This way of speaking is inaccurate because it is not like Ken chopped 
down his tree and then the worlds selected for the ways their trees fall. This just makes 
the point stranger; how exactly does Mysterion work?100 Second, plenitude and agency 
imply that isolation fails precisely because of Mysterion. Since Mysterion is causal, and 
present at all worlds, then the worlds are causally connected, and from Section 2.5, that 
means everything is actual. This gets me Point (4) from my argument. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Mysterion's role is made the more complex when considering the role of the "real" plurality of worlds. If 
there are agents at multiple worlds, and billions at our own, this would have serious effects across the 
plurality. Consider the Clares as three examples among countless more. Perhaps some story can be told 
about how, say, Clare1 grows up and Mysterion has made it so that the greater influences in her life were 
those of, say, Jedi Knighthood. Maybe, cake baking and technical essay writing do not even exist at her 
world! Or maybe they did, but Clare1 was genetically disposed to Jedi Knighthood (perhaps she has a high 
midichlorian count?). Or some other sort of story about how Mysterion tweaks with tuche just enough to 
ensure the Clares act in such a way as to ensure plenitude.  
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 So plenitude and agency requires that isolation fails. To recap the story, GMR 
begins with the view that worlds evince “all different outcomes of the chance process” 
(the quote is from Lewis (1986d, p. 129)). The chance process actualizes (Section 2.5) 
worlds. Our world, the actual world, is the way it is because of the chance process in our 
world formation (leaving temporarily aside questions of agency). Other worlds and their 
parts are un-actualized (from our standpoint) possibilities and represent ways our world 
could have been. Each of those worlds is actual at itself. In terms of the dialectic I 
introduced in Chapter 4, one could say that worlds evince “all different outcomes of 
tuche,” which is what POR expresses. POR’s “enforcer” is just the chance process. Of 
course, the language of an enforcer can simply be dropped; POR is just a way of 
formulating all different outcomes of the tuche process; of logical space in all its glory.  
 But with the consideration of agents, the dialectic changed. POR could not 
express plenitude for agents, as agency evinces another kind of modality, techne-based. 
Thus, (APOR) was "developed." And (APOR) must contain something like “whatever an 
agent can do, an agent in fact does” in its formulation (Section 5.1). The "enforcer" of 
such a statement is Mysterion. But, if we drop the "enforcer" talk, (APOR) is just a way 
of formulating all different outcomes of the techne process. But, as we shall see there 
really can be no (APOR) because (APOR) is just POR in disguise. At this point, it is 
helpful to return to the three questions from the Clare example. Remember we are 
assuming plenitude and agency still. 
 What role are the agents playing? What role is Mysterion playing? What role is 
the chance process playing? The answer to the first question is "they have no role." The 
answer to the second question is "there is no such thing as Mysterion because there can 
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be no (APOR)." The answer to the third question is "the chance process (tuche) is playing 
the only role." Or, in other words, (APOR) is just POR in disguise. 
 The best way to explain is to begin with why (APOR) is just POR in disguise. To 
begin, the same question of agency arises for Mysterion as for the chance process. That 
is, one of the big questions of this dissertation has been whether or not the world left to 
itself is sufficient to account for agential actions. Of course, if one is an agent-
causationist, then the answer is a resounding 'no.' Since Mysterion would be the analogue 
of the chance process, one might ask if Mysterion is sufficient to account for agential 
actions. So now, we are not asking if agents act via technes, we are asking if Mysterion is 
enough to enforce plenitude, in a parallel way to asking if the chance process is enough to 
enforce plenitude. The clearest picture of this is the three Clares. Even with (APOR), the 
demand is the same as with POR: each Clare can only "choose" in such a way that 
plenitude is satisfied. But note, now we are back in exactly the same place this 
dissertation started.  
 What I mean is that we are stuck with the puzzle of plenitude that has been 
discussed from the beginning of this dissertation: if there are agents and plenitude holds, 
what happens at the "moment of decision" at each of the three Clare worlds? Changing 
the name from 'chance' to 'Mysterion' does not help because it is only a name change. To 
show this, I am now going to demonstrate that the formulation of POR and (APOR) are 
identical.  
 What (APOR) requires is something like “necessarily, there is a world in which 
an agent (one of the Clares) bakes a delicious cake, a world in which an agent constructs 
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a lightsaber, and a world in which an agent writes a technical essay.”101 But note that this 
does not differ in anyway from the form of POR: “necessarily there is an x world, a y 
world, etc…” Now if such a formulation expresses the chance process (tuche), and 
(APOR) is identical in form, then it implies that tuche “enforces” it, not Mysterion. This 
is made all the more clear when it is remembered that there should be no "enforcer" to 
decide which agent does what anyway because agential actions are defined against tuche. 
An agential action mitigates or eliminates the effects of the world and cannot be reduced 
to the world.  
 So if we consider the Clares again, there is no reason why each Clare might not 
have constructed a lightsaber. And I do not mean this in the sense Lewis expresses in his 
account of representation de re (Section 5.1). I mean that possibly, each Clare makes a 
lightsaber. I mean that possibly each Clare in the three-world plurality could have 
constructed a lightsaber, although each one could have chosen instead to bake a delicious 
cake or write a technical essay. Each Clare, through the employment of the relevant series 
of technes, could have chosen to become a Jedi. The point is that a failure of plenitude is 
a distinct possibility.  
 In review, there is no “Mysterion” behind (APOR). There is not even an (APOR). 
(APOR) is an attempt at reducing techne-based modality to tuche-based modality. So, it 
is not Mysterion that would tweak with each world just enough to ensure plenitude; it is 
none other than tuche. It is pretty clear this does not make sense if there are agents 
because techne-based modality is defined against its effects on tuche.102 This is why I do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Due to the qualitative/de re distinction, this formulation does not specify which world must be which, 
just that whatever ways the worlds came to be, each of these comes to pass somewhere. 
102 It is important to reiterate that I am not saying all decisions by agents are purely technes. For example, 
suppose I grew up in feudal Japan. In effect, tuche has determined where I am and also, because of the era, 
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not think it possible to get (APOR). The point is just that each of the three Clares really 
could bake a delicious cake, and there is absolutely no guarantee of plenitude. If 
plenitude holds, it might not have. This is just part of the meaning of agential modality. 
This gets me Point (3) and (5) from my argument. So what happens then if a genuine 
modal realist decides to abandon plenitude?  
 It seems like there now might be a good reason to; the genuine modal realist could 
now keep agency and isolation. She could keep isolation because she is not demanding 
that all outcomes of agential choice be actual at some world. Agents really determine (at 
least sometimes) what sort of world they inhabit. The cost is just plenitude. Now, I think 
(5) is established. But one might wonder why one should believe in a plurality of worlds 
now. It was supposed to be an abductive argument that offered inter alia a full analysis of 
possibility that provided a paradise for philosophers. But now, the plurality does not 
represent every possibility....just like our own world. And that means that, at least 
sometimes, modality is not quantification over worlds, because sometimes there are no 
worlds to represent the content.  
 So it seems like the genuine modal realist really has one option. If a genuine 
modal realist wants to hold onto plenitude, then he better deny agency at any possible 
world. This is so because there would be no way to accommodate techne-based modality, 
since any such attempt either falls back into POR, or results in a failure of plenitude.103  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain professions would be precluded like being an astronaut or an airplane pilot. So, in some sense, tuche 
has limited my array of options (and also expanded them…I could not be a samurai today for example). But 
I can still employ my technes to some degree. The point is just that there are some decisions and courses of 
actions that are deliberate acts of reason if an agency theory is to hold. 
103 If a version of GMR wanted to keep agency, I suppose a story could be told about how plenitude does 
not hold. Or, in other words, that it is not the case that plenitude is necessary. This might give some room 
for isolation, because the plurality of worlds would not need to be "full." Such a move would require an 
abandonment of the necessity of the plurality. Remember, Lewis considers the plurality a necessary truth. 
But this seems largely based on plenitude. For very different reasons, Josh Parsons (2012) suggests that 
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 To sum up this section, there are serious consequences for attempting to combine 
GMR and agency. First, assuming it even possible, this would imply transworld causation 
and the transworld butterfly effect. In effect, everything would be actual because isolation 
fails. From Section 2.5, Lewis admits that if he had to admit everything was actual, it 
would signify a grand defeat for GMR. This gets me (4) from my main argument. But, if 
one chooses to keep GMR and agency, and reject plenitude, then motivation for GMR is 
largely lost (5). 
 Really, however, agency and plenitude are incompatible because (APOR) cannot 
express plenitude for techne-based modality without turning it into tuche-based modality 
(3). That is, (APOR) is really just POR in disguise. But if one wants to keep POR, then 
one has to abandon agent causation views for the whole plurality of worlds (6)! This 
section has demonstrated, then, that the holder of GMR really only has one option, and 
that is to deny agency altogether. The next section deals with the consequences of this 
course of action. 
5.3 Consequences for GMR without Agency 
 In the last section, I argued, inter alia, that one of the fallouts of rejecting agency 
is that there could be no agency at any possible world. I have also argued that techne-
based modality is not captured by or reducible to POR. As a consequence, if one insists 
on being a genuine modal realist and accepting plenitude, then this implies that there is 
no agency at any world. This is the second prong of the fork. 
This is a startling consequence of GMR. Those who are disinclined to accept agency 
might not find this so startling or even problematic. But I am going to argue that even if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
denying the necessity of the plurality of worlds is a coherent option for the genuine modal realist. 
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one does not accept agency at THIS world, GMR is the wrong sort of argument to 
conclude that ALL worlds are devoid of it.  
To begin, let’s first consider yet another jarring consequence of GMR. One of the 
classic inquiries of metaphysics is why there is something rather than nothing. Or, could 
it have been the case that there was nothing rather than something (I’ll explain this shift 
in the question later)? Lewis (1986d) answers this way: “If a world is a maximal 
mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things, that makes no provision for an 
absolutely empty world…there isn’t any world where there’s nothing at all. That makes it 
necessary that there is something” (p. 73). By itself, this does not mean much more than 
necessarily, every world has something. But then Lewis (1986d) explains the “jarring 
consequence” I referred to:  
 “…nothing isn’t a very minimal something. Minimal worlds there can indeed be. 
 There can be nothing much: just some homogeneous unoccupied spacetime, or 
 maybe only one single point of it. But nothing much is still something, and there 
 isn’t any world where there’s nothing. That makes it necessary that there is 
 something. For it’s true at all worlds there is something: it’s true whenever we 
 restrict our quantifiers to the domain of parts of a single world, even if the only 
 part of some world is one indivisible nondescript point. Of course, if we don’t 
 restrict quantifiers form the standpoint of one world or another, then all the more 
 is it true that there is something rather than nothing: there is logical space, the 
 totality of worlds in all their glory. How bad is this?” (p. 73) (italics mine).  
Lewis (1986d) answers his question by saying that he is not explaining why there is 
something rather than nothing (p. 73). Because he is not answering this latter question, 
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Lewis (1986d) thinks this consequence of GMR is not so bad (pp. 73-74).104 This, by the 
way, is why I shifted the question above. Lewis is not answering the question of why 
there is something rather than nothing, but rather, could there have been nothing. To this 
he answers no. In summary, and a bit crudely: necessarily, the plurality of worlds. It 
could not have been the case that there was nothing.  
Depending on one’s perspective, this could be great news that a theory is able to 
make significant progress in an area of philosophical inquiry. Others might think that 
GMR is not the right kind of theory to settle such an inquiry. Whichever way one goes, 
GMR requires a response because it begins with what exists and attempts to account for 
modality. There is no clear reason why Lewis cannot make this move. The person that 
thinks GMR is not the right kind of theory to settle such a question would have to begin 
by, say, showing that existence has ontological distinctions such that they cannot be 
compared in the way GMR requires. I have no idea what this would look like, by the 
way.105 My point is that one might think that just as GMR has made significant progress 
in this area of philosophy, so too it has made significant progress in clearing up the 
agency debate. So in a similar way, one might think that GMR requires a response 
because there is no clear reason why it cannot make progress here too. If GMR has the 
consequence that there is no agency at any world, this can be lumped in with the great 
benefits of Lewis’ theory and the onus is on the dissenter to show why GMR cannot have 
this consequence.  
But there is a serious disanalogy here. The disanalogy consists in an analysis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For more on Lewis’ views of causal explanation, see: Lewis (1986b). 
105 But Kris McDaniel (2010) might be able to help. He argues for kinds of existences, or ways of being. 
Interestingly, at the end of his chapter, McDaniel (2010) applies his discussion to Lewis’ modal realism 
showing how it could actually help Lewis (pp. 315-316).  
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quantifiers and what they can range over on the one hand, and agency on the other. 
Whether one looks around or considers her own personal existence, it is virtually not 
contested that something exists.106 More, it seems that whatever exists, can be quantified 
over (even if there are different kinds of existence). But, do agents at least sometimes 
determine the sort of world in which they live? Or not? This debate is nothing like the 
existence and quantification debate. The reason GMR can get very good results for the 
puzzle of existence is because GMR assumes the existence of many things, all of which 
can be quantified over. These are very reasonable assumptions.  
However, it cannot get a good result with agency because the debate here is largely 
unsettled. What I mean is that it is virtually incontrovertible that stuff exists; it is very 
controversial whether or not there are agents.107 Because this is such a clouded issue, 
GMR cannot settle the debate without some kind of argument. In fact, GMR, if it wants 
to keep plenitude, will have to argue very explicitly that there could be no such thing as 
agency at any world. As it is, POR describes tuche-based modality, and, as I argued, there 
is no way it can capture techne-based modality. Of course, it is very debatable whether or 
not there is a techne-based modality; but that is the same thing as saying that it is 
debatable whether or not there are agents. In this regard, there is nothing in GMR that 
deals with the puzzle of agency at all; as such, it can settle no debates about agency. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 There are those who would argue that all is illusion, or that reality (by which is usually meant our 
perception of the world around us) is false. However, I will say with Descartes that even if we are horribly 
deceived, there is still something, me, being deceived. There is something rather than nothing. 
107 There are other ways to make the point that GMR can settle the existence issue, but not make parallel 
progress with agency. One might argue that the issue of whether there could have been nothing instead of 
something is opaque and convoluted; GMR can settle it, if it wants to. But it is obvious and clear that we 
have agency, so this cannot be given up to GMR. To make this point, one would have to be convinced that 
1.) the something rather than nothing issue really is convoluted, and 2.) that agency is obviously true. But 
to do this, one would have to argue strongly on behalf of agency. I am not doing that here. Also, I think the 
opposite: I think the something rather than nothing issue is quite clear, but the agency issue is very, very 
murky. I would like to thank Katherine Hawley for discussion on these points. 
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upshot of this is that, if the Lewisian goes the route of saying there is no agency at any 
world, this is little more than a bald assertion because there is nothing in GMR that can 
settle the agency debate.  
 It might sound like I am saying that Lewis and Lewisians have no arguments for 
there being no agency. I am not. But they will be convinced on empirical and 
philosophical grounds of such views of agency. And this is precisely the point; the debate 
about agency has to be settled apart from GMR because POR only accounts for tuche-
based modality. Or more accurately, plenitude is only possible with tuche-based 
modality. Returning to the prong of the fork: GMR requires that there could be no agency 
at any possible world if plenitude is to hold. This is a stunning consequence for a theory 
that has nothing in it to settle the agency debate at our world, much less all the worlds of 
the plurality. 
There is another angle from which to look at this too. Suppose that it was definitively 
proven that at our world, there is no such thing as agency. No doubt, and no debate about 
it. Would this make GMR more palatable? It would seem so, on the one hand. It would 
seem that plenitude would not need to account at all for techne-based modality because, 
at least at our world, there is no such thing. Since our best theories about the world would 
then be devoid of agential considerations, we would have no reason to incorporate this 
into our philosophizing about the plurality of worlds. Or would we? 
Lewis (1986d) said that:  
“As the realm of sets is for mathematicians, so logical space is a paradise for 
philosophers. We have only to believe in the vast realm of possibilia, and there 
we find what we need to advance our endeavours. We find the wherewithal to 
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reduce the diversity of notions we must accept as primitive, and thereby to 
improve the unity and economy of the theory that is our professional concern - 
total theory, the whole of what we take to be true” (p. 4; italics mine).  
I take Lewis to mean that GMR provides the resources and flexibility to unify and 
systematize into one coherent master theory all the theories and disciplines. All these 
theories and disciplines would now have one less problem: the agency debate. POR, now, 
accommodates our best theories about the world. Returning to my question: “Or would 
we?” We would, I think. Even if we definitively proved there was no such thing as 
agency at our world, the fact remains that agency is not obviously an incoherent idea. 
Otherwise, how would we have been deceived by it for so long?  
 The Lewisian might argue that agency was a grand illusion and a long-entertained 
fiction. Just because it seemed possible did not make it so. As Lewis (1986d) has said, 
“imaginability is a poor criterion of possibility” (p. 90).108 If our world has no agency, 
POR should get points for expressing modality without the burden of long-entertained 
fictions. The upshot of this thought experiment is that if it was shown there is no such 
thing as agency at this world, perhaps there would be no reason to suspect that it is 
plausible at any world. 
 My response is that even if there were no agency at our world, GMR does not get 
points for keeping it out of the theory. It was only shown that our world was devoid of 
agency. It would be bad empirical science to take one world and generalize to all worlds, 
as it would be bad empirical science to conduct an experiment once and generalize the 
results. Actually, I misspoke. There is no such thing as empirical science across worlds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Some philosophers would dispute this claim and say that imaginability is a good criterion of possibility. 
One such philosopher is David Chalmers (2011). 
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given isolation: there is no observation, no repeatable phenomena, no experimentation 
that can be done across worlds.109 But this just reinforces my point that POR, and GMR 
generally, cannot settle any debates about agency. Since one could not use empirical 
methods in any way to garner support for the theory, purely philosophical methods must 
be employed. Such methods will examine the coherency of agency, and, indeed, there 
seem to be plenty of theories of agency that are in fact coherent. They are wrong in this 
thought experiment, but they are coherent. They, therefore, cannot be ruled out when 
considering the plurality of worlds. The genuine modal realist would have to find ways of 
arguing that any kind of agency theory is, in fact, incoherent. Then she could have 
POR.110 And this brings us back to reality: it has not been definitively shown that our 
world is devoid of agency and GMR contains nothing to warrant the hidden conclusion 
that at no world could there be agency.  
 While denying agency is the better bet for the Lewisian, the cost is still to high 
because GMR is not the right kind of argument to deny agency at all possible worlds. The 
possibility of agency costs GMR its neutrality on the issue. Specifically, POR is not 
flexible (or “objective”) enough to accommodate agency. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Here is another interesting point. Let’s continue to suppose our world is devoid of agency. Can one 
empirically be certain that the physics of our world coudn’t produce agents? Much less the set of worlds 
with our physics? Still less, the physics of the all the worlds in the whole plurality? 
110 I have serious doubts about the existence of any such arguments. But my point is that there is work to do 
in justifying POR, which excludes agency. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and the Reforging of Beedle’s Fork 
 Beedle’s original fork neglected the qualitative/de re distinction and isolation 
respectively. The result was that his sense of modal fatalism was that each particular 
world was necessarily the way it is and could not have been otherwise. In his other 
argument from counterfactual causation, he tried to show that our desire for our world to 
be certain ways was simultaneously a desire for other worlds to be other ways. But this 
was shown to be problematic as well. On the one hand, one is not required to worry about 
other worlds given isolation; and on the other hand, without a transworld connection 
across worlds, desires about other worlds are pointless.  
However, the governing intuition behind his concern is, I think, very good. He is 
concerned that in some way, GMR requires a drastic revision of how we see ourselves as 
agents. What I have done is to attempt to show how.  
I did so by arguing if there is such a thing as agency, then another kind of modality is 
thereby implied. Here, again, is the argument I used: 
 (1) According to many theories of agency, agential actions are of a qualitatively 
different kind of modality than chance-based modality. 
 (2) But POR in GMR only accounts for “chance-based” modality. 
 (3) No similar POR-like principle can be given for agential modality that does not 
collapse into POR. 
 (4) But even if a POR-like principle could be found, it would violate isolation 
because such a principle implies transworld causation.  
 (5) If no POR-like principle can be found AND there is agential modality, then 
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plenitude fails or at least is not guaranteed (which is the same as failure for GMR). 
 (6) If there is no such thing as agential modality, and POR is correct, then GMR 
implies no agency at any world; necessarily, there is no agency (from (2)). 
 (Conclusion) If there is agency and GMR holds, then plenitude fails, or isolation 
fails (from (4), (5)). But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then necessarily there is 
no agency at any possible world (from (2), (3), (6)).  
 I argued for (1)-(2) by explaining that if there is such a thing as agency, then this 
can be expressed via techne-based modality. Techne-based modality is of a 
fundamentally different kind than tuche-based modality. Techne-based modality cannot 
be reduced to tuche-based by definition, since tuche-based modality is rooted in chance, 
while techne-based modality is based on deliberate application of reason that mitigate the 
effects of tuche. Therefore, if there is such a thing as agency, a world is insufficient to 
account for everything that happens at worlds with agents.  
I argued for (3) by saying that POR cannot express agential possibilities because they 
are not reducible to the chance process. I argued for (4) by saying that even if a parallel 
formulation of agential plenitude, APOR, could be articulated, isolation would fail 
because of the transworld butterfly effect. If isolation fails, then everything is actual. 
 If no APOR could be formulated, and there is agential modality, then a consequence 
of this is (5); there is no guarantee that plenitude holds with regard to agential actions. 
Each of the Clares, for example, could have each decided to bake a delicious cake. That 
is, if there is agency and one wants to preserve isolation, then one must reject plenitude. 
 If there is no such thing as agential modality, and POR is correct, then GMR 
implies that there are no agents at any world (this is (6)) on pain of the consequences of 
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(4) and (5). 
So the two prongs of the fork I replaced Beedles' with are these. If there is agency, 
then either one loses plenitude in order to keep isolation, or one loses isolation in order to 
preserve plenitude. The second prong of the fork is to simply abandon agency with all its 
talk of techne-based modality. The consequence being that no world contains agents. The 
problem with this is that GMR is the wrong sort of argument to settle the agency question 
one way or another. This sums up (Conclusion). 
 I think what Beedle et al were wrestling with is the connection between agency 
and modality. It was assumed that modality is of a kind, and trying to discuss necessity 
and possibility without these ontologically distinct catogries of modality proved very 
difficult and confusing.  
 Moreover, Beedle in his arguments left out important considerations. Specifically, 
he did not take into account the qualitative/de re distinction, and he did not argue for a 
causal link across worlds for his argument from counterfactual causation. So he could not 
get fatalism on the one hand, or an ethically questionable sense of agency on the other. 
 What I did was to show the heart of the problem is POR and how there could be 
no such principle to govern agency. So on my view then, ‘no agency at any world’ is my 
replacement for Beedle’s modal fatalism prong of the fork. And if there are agents 
together with plenitude, then there is a transworld causal link; this replaces Beedle’s 
argument from desire (his counterfactual causation argument).111   This is Beedle’s fork 
reforged.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Or a genuine modal realist can keep agency, but deny plenitude. But then, what is the motivation for 
GMR on this option? 
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6.1 Assessment of the Effects of Beedle's Fork Reforged on GMR 
 Beedle's fork reforged places GMR in hot water. One of the things that made 
GMR so attractive was its neutrality and flexibility with regard to agency. It was 
supposed to have the resources to accommodate any theory. The grounding for this 
neutrality and flexibility was that modality was of a kind. However, if there are such 
things as agents, then POR is neither flexible enough to accommodate agency, nor is it 
neutral about agency. It is not flexible enough to accommodate agency because POR does 
not cover the right kind of modality to "range over" agential actions.  
 It is also not neutral because the theory requires that either there are no agents, or 
plenitude is not guaranteed. Clearly, in order to retain much of its initial attraction, the 
theory should keep plenitude. After all, what's the point of an ontologically expensive 
theory if it does not even cover the costs of all possibilities? But keeping plenitude 
requires either a transworld causal force, or a denial of agency at all worlds. The best 
option for GMR is the latter, but this is the point: it is no longer neutral with regard to 
agency. GMR can give us a philosophers' paradise only if it bars agency from the 
discussion. But this is not the right argument to bar agency. 
 In summary, Beedle's fork reforged reveals what seemed so strange about GMR 
and agency. GMR requires a drastic shift in how we think of ourselves as agents. The key 
to understanding how was to unpack what it means to say that agency is a causal force in 
the world. Since agency is of a different causal order than the chance process, it has an 
ontologically distinct modality too. POR simply cannot accommodate such a modality. 
This causes the loss of neutrality and flexibility on the part of GMR.  
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